Abstract
The Department of Defense Y2K effort has been guided by its Year 2000 Management Plan, currently at version 2.0. There are three tiers of system classifications: mission-critical, mission-essential, and non-mission-critical. Since the beginning of its effort, the DOD has focused almost exclusively on fixing systems, and only recently on testing contingency plans. The DOD has been criticized by auditors numerous times on the slowness of its effort. They have reclassified and re-estimated their number of mission-critical systems at every quarter. The DOD Y2K budget has also risen every quarter, most recently to $2.5 billion. The armed services have been equally slow, despite well-publicized successful tests of major weapons systems. Major defense contractors seem on top of the effort, having started to pay attention to the problem far before the DOD, although the specific information they provide in their disclosures is vague. On the international defense front, as is true for most other sectors, other countries are far behind the United States in terms of preparation.
Contents
This paper will examine Y2K issues as they apply to the American military infrastructure. In the Background section we introduce the Department of Defense organizational structure and highlight the areas of the department we will be focusing on. We also introduce key players in the military Y2K effort. In Section 3, we examine the arc of the DOD Y2K initiative from start to present. In Section 4 we define mission-critical systems, speculate on their time-sensitive nature, and analyze the changes in the repair estimates of these systems over time. In the following three sections we examine the Y2K efforts of the Army, Navy and Air Force respectively. In Section 8 we examine the Y2K status of some of the major defense contractors. In Section 9 we focus on Y2K efforts of foreign defense departments. In Section 10 we conclude with a summary and predictions.
2.1 Y2K
The Year 2000 problem has received enough coverage in the press that the basic idea behind the problem is well understood: "the inability of computer systems to process correctly the Year 2000 date" [Wol98]. For an excellent explanation of the technological issues and solutions behind Y2K, refer to Peter de Jager's article [Jag99].
2.2 DOD
The Department of Defense is a large, sprawling entity. It is comprised of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, three Military Departments, nine Unified Combatant Commands, the DOD Inspector General, fifteen Defense Agencies, and nine DOD Field Activities. The following chart, provided on the DOD web site, offers insight into the organizational complexity of the department. For the purposes of this paper, we will be focus on the three branches of the military, and the Y2K effort from the top level of the DOD.
Source: [DOD96a]
2.3 People and Groups
There are numerous key figures involved in the Y2K effort of the American military whose names reoccur in the press. These are:
Defense Secretary William Cohen. According to the DOD Y2K management plan the Secretary of Defense has no direct role in Y2K, but as the head, it is he who will ultimately answer for the department as a whole.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. John Hamre. One of the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as detailed in the DOD Y2K management plan, is to head the DoD Y2K Steering Committee, which was "established to oversee progress, provide guidance and make decisions related to Y2K" [DOD98]. In this role Deputy Secretary Hamre is the man who most often makes statements about the Y2K efforts of the DOD to the press.
Arthur L. Money is the DOD Chief Information Officer,
a civilian position. His roles in Y2K include "[formulating],
[implementing], and [overseeing] an aggressive DoD Y2K program,"
"[representing] DoD on the President's Council on Year 2000
Conversion," "[coordinating] DoD's efforts to support
the President's Council on Y2K Conversion," "[establishing]
and [maintaining] DoD-wide policy guidance and strategies addressing
the Y2K problem, and "[serving] as the Executive Secretary
to the DoD Year 2000 Steering Committee" [DOD98].
William Curtis is the DOD "Y2K Czar." Unlike Arthur Money, it is Curtis' full-time job to address Y2K in the DOD. He is head of the Year 200 Oversight Office, part of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, OASD(C3I) [DOD98].
Representative Stephen Horn (R-CA). As Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, Congressman Horn releases quarterly grades on Y2K progress in the major federal agencies. He has repeatedly given failing and near-failing grades to the DOD.
Lt. Gen. William Campbell is the Army's Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers (DISC4) [C4I98].
Miriam Browning is the director of information management in the Army's Office of the DISC4. She has also been labeled the branch's "Y2K czar" [C4I98].
The GAO is the General Accounting Office of the federal government.
The IG is the Department of Defense Inspector General,
who "serves as an independent and objective official in the
Department of Defense who is responsible for conducting, supervising,
monitoring, and initiating audits, investigations, and inspections
relating to programs and operations of the Department of Defense"
[DOD96].
The OMB is the Office of Management and Budget, an agency of the White House whose mission is "to assist the President in overseeing the preparation of the Federal budget and to supervise its administration in Executive Branch agencies. In helping to formulate the President's spending plans, OMB evaluates the effectiveness of agency programs, policies, and procedures, assesses competing funding demands among agencies, and sets funding priorities" [OMB99].
In March of 1998 Congressman Stephen Horn (R-California), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, issued his quarterly grades on Y2K preparedness to 24 federal agencies. The Department of Defense received an F. [Lew98a]. In Horn's next quarterly grade report in June, the DOD had only progressed to a D minus. According to an article in Federal Computer Week, "Horn's subcommittee based agencies' grades on the percentage of mission-critical systems that agencies have reprogrammed to be Year 2000-compliant as well as the percentage of systems that agencies said they would have Year 2000-compliant by March 1999" [Til98].
The Department of Defense's Y2K preparation has followed an arc that has become all too commonly observed in the national Y2K initiative: initial downplaying of the problem; reevaluation of the cost, effort, and time needed; misrepresentation-either intentional or unintentional-of the percentage of compliant systems; audit of systems by an external party that finds inadequate preparation; and finally the use of ultimatums, threats and pressure to insure timely compliance and preparedness.
3.1 The Road to Compliance is Paved with Early Optimism
The DOD first released its "Year 2000 Management Plan" in May 1997. The plan has since been succeeded by version 2.0, released in December 1998, which is available on the web site of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) (C3I) [DOD98]. The key points and features of the original 1997 plan were:
At the time of the plan's release, the Pentagon had planned to assess its mission critical systems by June 1 of that year. These numbers would see much fluctuation over the following years. Earlier in 1997, Defense Secretary William Cohen had estimated in a report to Congress that it would cost the DOD an estimated $900 million to fix the Y2K problem. This estimate would continue to rise over the following two years [Ben97].
When Air Force Lt. Gen. Albert Edmonds, stepped down as director of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in June 1997, he expressed the opinion that the DOD's Y2K problem was "exaggerated," and that "everybody thinks we have the biggest problem because of our large number of legacy systems." He believed that preventing Y2K failure in DOD systems was a matter of deciding which systems to eliminate and which systems to fix, that the current estimate of $900 million was enough to fund the necessary changes, and that the top level DOD officials sufficiently understood the problem. "We'll pay for it. We always do," Edmonds said [Ben97a].
3.2 Costs Rise
By July of 1997 it had become clear that the DOD's initial budget estimates for Y2K preparation had been underestimated. This would not be the last time. Defense Secretary Cohen's original estimate of $900 million was increased to $1.3 billion, and it was expected that the cost would rise as more of the DOD's agencies assessed their systems for Y2K compliance. The budget breakdown was:
3.3 2012?
In December of 1997, Stephen Horn's Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology reported that if the DOD proceeded at its current rate of fixing Y2K problems, mission critical systems would not be compliant until the year 2012. In a letter to the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Horn suggested that focusing on first-tier, mission-critical systems, as had been done for approximately the last year, was no longer enough, and that second- and third-tier systems, namely those classified as business-critical and business-important needed to be addressed as well. Horn also criticized the DOD for continuously changing the number of mission-critical systems, stating that they were simply reclassifying systems, not fixing them [Wol97].
In February of 1998, the Defense Science Board (DSB) criticized the DOD's Y2K efforts as a national security risk. In its report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it stated that the ""DOD should assume that hackers will try to cause mischief, including exposing and widely disseminating Y2K vulnerabilities." It recommended the appointment of a full-time executive with staff, whose task it would be to oversee the Y2K conversion of the Department [Lew98].
3.4 Full-Time Oversight Director Appointed
In response to the DSB's recommendation in March 1998 Art Money, the deputy assistant secretary for C3I appointed William Curtis, formerly the head of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), to head the newly formed Year 2000 Oversight Office. Curtis would be part of the C3I office, and responsible for assessing the DOD computer system links both internally in the Department and externally with other agencies and with U.S. allies [Wol98].
One of Curtis' first steps in the initiative was to propose in April 1998 a 1,250-man certification force within to DOD to review computer systems and ensure that they were compliant. He suggested 250 five-man teams, each tem to be typically composed of three representatives of the service to which the system belonged, one external Y2K auditor, and one member of another service. This idea was based on the system the Air Force was already using to certify its systems for Y2K compliance. Curtis stressed the importance of testing not only each individual system, but each system it interfaced with, whether that system was contained internally in the DOD or externally in another agency. One of the most complex systems to test, according to Curtis, would be DOD payroll and accounting [C4I98a].
Soon after, the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced its intention to hold a series of joint Y2K tests in early 1999, the first major tests since the DOD's Y2K initiative began. William Curtis characterized the message intended by the tests as: "If you want to make a move on the USA in December 1999, we will be ready." At this point the estimated Y2K budget was almost $2 billion, though the number of mission-critical systems had dropped to around 2,200 [Ben98].
3.5 Auditing and Criticism
The next entity to join in the criticism of the DOD's Y2K initiative would be the Defense Department Inspector General, who reported in June 1998 that system managers were reporting Y2K compliance of mission critical systems without proper certification. The report stated that "if DOD does not take the action that it needs to obtain accurate information as to the status of its Y2K efforts, we believe that serious Y2K failures may occur in DOD mission-critical information technology systems." Stephen Horn commented on the report at a hearing held by his subcommittee by saying "I thought we were past the days of the Vietnam body count." According to the DOD's Y2K management plan, system managers were supposed to be certifying systems after signing a compliance checklist. When the Inspector General's office examined 430 systems reported compliant in November 1997, it found that for many systems, proper documentation was not available that showed correct procedures had been followed in assessing the Y2K compliance of a system.
William Curtis expressed the belief that the certification was not an intentional deception on the part of the managers, and that a new management plan would be released within the following few days to clarify compliance certification procedures [Bar98].
Shortly preceding the IG's report of the DOD audit, Art Money wrote a letter to the office agreeing that "we need your review of the update to make sure it improves guidance on verification and validation requirements, especially with regard to independent certification rather than self-certification. We will use the results of your audit to improve the reporting instructions." The IG's report addressed Money's letter saying it did not describe specific changes that would prevent erroneous reporting of compliance, and the report called for a clarification of certification requirements, the issuing of clear year 2000 quarterly reporting requirements by the DOD, and the establishment of oversight processes and procedures for the individual services, agencies, and DOD components [Sla98].
Further pressure on the DOD's Y2K initiative came in August 1998 from the highest echelons of the DOD. In a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary William Cohen threatened to impose a moratorium on software development in the DOD if it failed to make significant progress in Y2K conversion by the end of 1998. As had been the tune from the beginning of the DOD's initiative, Cohen expressed that while progress was being made, it simply wasn't being made fast enough to ensure complete preparedness by the end of 1999. The number of mission-critical systems had increased since the previous report in May. Under Cohen's plan, if significant progress was not reflected in November and December, "further modifications to software, except those needed for Y2K remediation, will be prohibited after Jan. 1, 1999." The memorandum had four orders, quoted here from an article in Government Computer News:
Further embarrassment came when a November audit of the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) by the Defense Department Inspector General found that the DSWA was inadequate in taking the proper steps to insure Y2K compliance. The responsibilities of the DSWA include nuclear weapons research and support, as well as planning for possible nuclear incidents, ensuring that advanced weapons can operate in a nuclear environment and, helping to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As quoted in C4I [Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence] News, the IG's audit found that the DSWA did not:
Only two out of five mission-critical DSWA systems and two out of ten non-critical systems were found to have been Y2K certified properly, with documented tests and compliance checklists [C4I98d].
3.6 War-games
On November 20, 1999 the DOD ran its first test of how the Department would react to computer failures due to the Y2K problem. Although the tests followed the model of war-game exercises, there were no enemies to contend with. Rather, the participants-mid-level DOD managers-dealt with mock scenarios in which computer bugs both benign and malicious crippled both DOD systems as well as critical systems outside the DOD, such as electricity, transportation and water supplies. The significance of these exercises were that they marked a move for the DOD from what had for almost two years been an exclusive strategy of fixing non-compliant systems, to preparing for the possibility that not all critical computer systems-both within the DOD and without-would be fixed and tested before January 1, 2000. Further such exercises were planned for January 1999, late February or March, and May or June. [Bre98]
3.7 Close of 1998: Rising Costs, Lagging Behind
In the last month of 1998, in a report to the OMB, the DOD again increased its estimate of Y2K repair costs from its previous amount of $1.9 billion to $2.5 billion. Of that amount, the Air Force repair cost was estimated at $1.2 billion, the Navy's at $474 million, and the Army's at $360 million. While the hope was that the DOD would have 95% of its mission-critical systems compliant and ready for end-to-end testing by the end of December 1998 [AFNS98], the truth was that as of December 6, only 52% of these systems were compliant, and that there was no way this goal would be reached in time [Cra98].
3.8 T Minus 338 Days: DOD Confident of Y2K Preparedness
Despite almost two years of being criticized on its Y2K effort by everyone from external auditors to internal high-ranking officials, in a statement at the end of January 1999, John Hamre, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated that 84% of mission-critical systems were Y2K compliant, and that approximately 2,300 of these systems would be compliant by January 1, 2000. The North American Air Defense System (NORAD) had recently been successfully tested with 30 simulated strategic missile events. Dates simulated included 31 December 1999 to 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2000 to 1 January 2001. Hamre also spoke optimistically of forthcoming contingency exercises like the ones performed in November 12, and of efforts made to extend Y2K support to Russia [Mic99].
In February of 1999, Congressamn Horn released the most recent quarterly Y2K report card. The Department of Defense received a C minus, up from a D minus [Fre99].
A great deal of concern has been displayed U.S. military Y2K experts over embedded systems within their weapons and information systems. It is difficult to speculate what such a wide category includes, and very little detailed press has been given to them. But, from looking at other industries, one can reasonably conclude that these systems include (but are most likely in no way limited to) such things as clocks within missile guidance systems, telemetry instrumentation for long-range targetting in vehicles such as tanks, even payroll systems. By their nature, embedded systems are more difficult to inventory, test, and fix than are more general software systems. Perhaps this is why the amount of press coverage has been so small for these systems, when compared with other, more easily fixed systems.
4.1 Definition
As defined in the Year 2000 Management plan, mission critical systems include those:
4.2 Statistics
The following chart of mission-critical systems is based on figures from quarterly DOD reports to the Office of Management and Budget, an agency of the White House. These figures come from reports by the press, and are not complete in some categories. The data in tabular form appear below the chart.
Total number of systems = # of compliant systems + # of systems to be replaced + # of systems to be terminated + # of systems to be repaired.
Total number of systems to be repaired = # of systems in assessment phase + # of systems in renovation phase + # of systems in validation phase + # of systems in implementation phase + # of systems that have completed repair.
An interesting trend to notice is the change in total number of critical systems over time. This is due to systems being reclassified in the second two classification tiers: mission essential and non-mission critical. This is probably for both budgetary and public relations reasons. An even more interesting trend is the leap from 21 percent compliance to 52 percent compliance in the period from August 1998 to November 1998. It is important to remember that at the end of August 1998, Defense Secretary William Cohen threatened the DOD with a moratorium on software development if the Y2K effort did not pick up its pace by the end of 1998. This seems a very likely motivating factor. Whether it motivated an actual speedup in work, or just a creativity with numbers is impossible to know.
| Date | August 1997 |
| Number of mission-critical systems | 3,962 |
| Number of compliant systems | 582 |
| Number being replaced | 473 |
| Planned terminations | 487 |
| To repair | 2,752 |
| Assessment | 141 |
| Renovation | 1,761 |
| Validation | 633 |
| Implementation | 138 |
| Completed repair | 220 |
Source: [Ben97b]
| Date | Nov 1997 | Feb 1998 | May 1998 | Aug 1998 |
| Number of mission-critical systems | 3,143 | 2,915 | 2,803 | 3,135 |
| Number of compliant systems | 672 | 535 | 480 | 682 |
| Number being replaced | 203 | 330 | 255 | 237 |
| Planned terminations | 128 | 164 | 170 | 141 |
| To repair | 2,140 | 1,886 | 1,898 | 2,075 |
| Assessment | 148 | 22 | 8 | 12 |
| Renovation | 1,045 | 873 | 789 | 605 |
| Validation | 605 | 690 | 647 | 745 |
| Implementation | 305 | 130 | 122 | 159 |
| Completed repair | 37 | 171 | 332 | 554 |
Source: [Sla98b]
| Date | November 1998 |
| Number of mission-critical systems | 2,581 |
| Number of compliant systems | 1,352 |
| Number being replaced | 102 |
| Planned terminations | 113 |
| To repair | 1,014 |
| Assessment | -- |
| Renovation | -- |
| Validation | -- |
| Implementation | -- |
| Completed repair | -- |
Source: [AFNS98]
| Date | January 1999 |
| Number of mission-critical systems | 2,304 |
| Number of compliant systems | 1,673 |
| Number being replaced | -- |
| Planned terminations | -- |
| To repair | -- |
| Assessment | -- |
| Renovation | -- |
| Validation | -- |
| Implementation | -- |
| Completed repair | -- |
Source: [Bre99]
| Date | Total number of mission-critical systems | % compliant |
| August 1997 | 3,962 | 15 |
| November 1997 | 3,143 | 21 |
| February 1998 | 2,915 | 18 |
| May 1998 | 2,803 | 17 |
| August 1998 | 3,135 | 21 |
| November 1998 | 2,581 | 52 |
| February 1999 | 2,304 | 73 |
5.1 Systems
Roughly half, or 209,204, of the Army's computer systems are not Y2K compliant, according to Lt. General Campbell.
Miriam Browning has stated that the Army maintains 376 mission-critical computer systems. These are the systems that are absolutely necessary for carrying on "core capabilities" (e.g., communication and transportation backbones). As of April 23, 1998, 160 of these 376 systems were Y2K compliant, 96 were going to be retired or replaced (presumably by compliant systems), and 120 required upgrades or repairs in order to be compliant.
But even of the 160 systems it believes are compliant, the Office of the DISC4 had documentation proving compliance for only 15 systems. Significant contact with manufacturers was expected, in order to get documentation for the remaining 145.
Regarding weapons systems, in April of 1998, Campbell noted that, although his systems managers made it appear that 90% were compliant, he was certain that the actual number was nowhere near that figure. He also said that the Army would have all contingency plans in place by June, 1998, and would have all systems upgraded and ready for testing by December, 1998.
Browning has placed personal computers, heating and cooling systems, traffic lights on bases, and dams under the heading "infrastructure computer systems." There are 196,777 of these systems that will require upgrades.
Noncritical communication systems are less a concern for the Office of the DISC4, but still have Y2K issues that must be addressed. A good majority of these systems are those that track Army materiel. There are 12,120 such systems requiring upgrades or replacement [C4I98].
White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico simulated the date rollover last July, in the largest base-wide test of its kind to date. Mission range computers, an F-14 fighter aircraft, and several helicopters (AH-64A Apache attack helicopter, AH-64D Longbow Apache attack helicopter, and OH- 58D Kiowa Warrior scout helicopter [AFNS99]) were tested. All equipment operated normally for more than two hours, during which 5 clock rollovers were simulated. White Sands has tested and fixed its 4,000 computers and 10,000 software applications. Systems tested include the Multiple-Launch Rocket System, the Army Tactical Missile System, the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense System and Patriot, as well as future systems such as the Medium-Extended Air Defense System, Navy Upper Tier and the future Space Shuttle [C4I98b].
5.2 Contingency Plans
To fulfill its tremendously important role of protecting the citizens of the United States of America, the military must be ready for any situation that may arise. The Army, in particular, has made it clear that its contingency plans will work. Miriam Browning stated that contingency plans range from sending military policemen to direct traffic in the case of failed traffic light systems, to running weapons systems manually, in case of critical weapons systems failure [Cah98a].
The Army has been criticized, however, for not having adequate contingency plans in place. The Army missed its June, 1998, for such plans. The GAO stated in December, 1999, that, "The Army's Year 2000 program is at risk of failure." The GAO further said that the Army simply does not have the managerial facilities established that are necessary to execute such a huge plan as the Y2K fix [IAA98]. The GAO's criticisms of the Army fall into four main categories:
First, the overall approach to the problem is not enough. According the GAO, the Army does not have a grasp of all its computer systems, and what Y2K problems they might have. Further, the Army's Y2K database (containing the systems with problems, status of fixes to those systems, etc.) is not designed properly, and could lead to improper reporting of Y2K problems.
Second, not all critical systems have "interface agreements" between them. An interface agreement is documentation stating that both sending and receiving systems are Y2K compliant. Without these agreements, there could be a serious domino effect of failing systems.
Third, as of May, 1998, only 96 of the Army's 376 mission-critical systems had contingency plans on file with the DISC4. The Army issued a statement that all systems must have contingency plans on file, but hardly more than a quarter (as of last May) had such plans.
Finally, as of May, the Army did not have a finalized testing procedure. This is a problem, the GAO says, because it is thought that testing Y2K fixes will constitute 60% of the total Y2K budget. Though all of the Army's mission-critical systems are beyond the assessment phase, the majority still do not have testing plans laid out.
To address these four problems, the GAO has given the Army a number of things that must be in place by the beginning of August, 1998. They include the following: accurate and complete inventory databases; comprehensive and reasonable cost estimates; registered contingency plans; preparation of memorandum for all interface agreements; and identification of required additional test resources.
5.3 Budget
Lt. General Campbell stated in April of 1998 that the Army's budget for the entirety of the Y2K problem was $366 million. [Cah98] By May of 1998, that number was at $429 million [Cah98b].
6.1 Systems
The Navy and Marine Corps have a total of 812 mission-critical systems that must be checked for Y2K problems (701 for the Navy, 111 for the Marine Corps). As of April 1998, according to the Navy, 191 are were being renovated, 441 were in the validation phase, 135 were in the completion phase, and 14 had been fixed. This is a total of 781 systems. The remaining systems were simply going to be eliminated.
The Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) is a leader in the Navy/Marine Corps systems that need to be fixed. In October of 1997, the cost estimate for fixing this system was $293 million [Wol98a].
According to a June 30, 1998 report made by the GAO, there are 1,575 non-mission-critical systems that could be affected by the Y2K bug, in addition to the 812 mission-critical systems. More than 2,000 of the combined 2,387 systems had yet to be tested for Y2K problems, though the Navy reported that 35% of its systems were Y2K-compliant (387 is roughly 16% of 2,387). It also claims that it does not know the status of 14.1% of the systems, leaving 50.6% vulnerable to the coming millennium.
Beyond the small numbers, the GAO says that the Navy is behind even in the first stages of its Y2K Action Plan, which was established in January, 1998. And the Navy has already spent a disproportionate amount of the time and money it allotted to the Y2K problem on its progress so far-60%.
Like the Army, the Navy has a lack of centralized leadership in the Y2K arena. The GAO comments that "The Navy took a decentralized approach to the Year 2000 effort but it did not initially establish a strong Year 2000 program office to manage it effectively." And beyond the lack of centralization, some of the major the component commands (notably, the Naval Air Systems Command and the Naval Sea Systems Command) that make up the Navy fleet did not appoint any full-time personnel to the Y2K problem.
But the Navy is not the only one to blame for this poor progress. In February of 1998, the comprehensive Defense Integration Support Tools database was classified, and access was apparently disallowed to the Navy. This meant that the Navy was on its own in identifying problems with its own systems, and perhaps "reinventing the wheel," as there are surely systems overlaps among the branches of the military. And because various commands have not reported their Y2K costs correctly, even this effort is being thwarted.
Also like the Army, the Navy has a large set of information interfaces-some 1051, to be exact-the systems on both sides of which must be ensured to be Y2K compliant, for either to function properly. As of September, 1998, only five of these interfaces was Y2K-compliant. These interfaces transmit data between the Navy and itself, other branches of the military, other government organizations, agencies, and foreign governments. Without the assurance that these links to the outside world are in place and functioning properly, the Navy could face a serious setback once January, 2000, rolls around.
As the Navy moves into the testing phase of the Y2K fix, it will have to spend more money than it has to date. But one odd aspect of the Navy's approach is that it has no set policy determining who will conduct the testing or who, where, and when it will take place. The fleet's current plan of attack is simply to let its individual vendors do all the testing, and have them report back on the results.
Because of the limited time left before the new year, the Navy is in rather dire straits. It does not have time to encounter any new unknown situations, with regard to Y2K problems. The GAO has given the Navy this recommendation for how to proceed from this point: complete an inventory of information systems; correct interfaces and sign written agreements with the entities on the other ends of the interfaces; develop fleet-wide plan for testing; finish a comprehensive contingency plan for all mission-critical systems. The Navy, as of September of 1998 was in agreement with these recommendations, and has said that it is creating an unclassified database of Y2K systems and fixes [GCN98].
The Navy's Block II Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, made by Raytheon, was tested in October last year at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, in Maryland. The missile passed all of its tests-both a launch in 1999 with a landing in 2000, and a launch in 2000 with a landing in 2000. The missile, though on the ground, went through all the stages in would in an actual flight.
The Pacific Fleet has recently finished a series of six in-port tests which involved forwarding the clocks on the each of the ships to January 1, 2000. No disruptions in service were noticed.
"There is nothing we've found that will prevent us from going to sea and doing our mission," said Capt. Timothy Traverso, who is the director for the Pacific Fleet's Command and Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I).
Ships tested included the USS Constellation (CV-64), USS Chosin (CG- 65), USS Ingraham (FFG-61), USS Stethem (DDG-63), USS Santa Fe (SSN- 763) and USS Olympia (SSN-717). All seemed to be Y2K-compliant. Only one system had any problems, and once it was restarted, it recognized the new year and operated correctly.
The Pacific Fleet will spend and estimated $80 million on Y2K issues [AFNS99b].
6.2 Contingency Plans
The GAO has had harsh words to say about the Navy's contingency planning. "The Navy is not developing contingency plans that focus on ensuring the continuity of its critical military operations and business processes," according to the Office. It contends that the Navy's preparedness is inadequate; but the Navy says something entirely different. According to the Navy, only seven of its 819 mission-critical systems even require a contingency plan. The Navy's position is that contingency plans should be developed only for those systems that are not going to be fixed by the new year. But the GAO has told all three branches of the military that all mission-critical systems must have filed contingency plans. "Navy operations may be severely disrupted if the Navy does not successfully remediate its mission-critical computer systems before the Year 2000 deadline," according to the GAO
6.3 Budget
As of April, 1998, the Navy planned to spend $421 million on its Y2K fixes.[Wol98a]. This number was up to $444 million by September [GCN98].
7.1 Systems
Lt. Colonel Greg Hanson is the head of the Air Force's Y2K
effort. Having started implementing the five-phased approach in
1995, before the DOD Y2K management plan even existed, he speaks
with authority when he tells his men, with regard to systems in
their control, "if it has a chip, check it" [Aer96].
The number of such mission-critical systems owned by the Air Force
is enormous-as of last month, there were 410. Among these systems
is the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS), which was built
by the Sanders division of Lockheed Martin. This software is a
mission planning system that allows "flight planning, route
planning, threat penetration, weapons delivery, target area tactics,
radar predictions, mapping and post-flight analysis" [Def98]. This system is clearly critical to the
Air Force's mission, and was a top priority in the force's Y2K
strategy. Deviating from what seems to be industry standard, Sanders
delivered a new, Y2K-compliant version of AFMSS to the Air Force
in early August, 1998. Further, Sanders sent the same system to
roughly 30 third-parties, allowing them to test their own additions
to the system. The system as a whole is currently being tested
in a central location, and will be delivered to each of the Air
Force's remote locations sometime this year. No major problems
with this system have been reported [Def98].
Less hopeful of completing Y2K preparation in time for the millennium
change is SPACECOM, the military's unified command in charge of
space control, surveillance, and assets, which is sorely behind
in its Y2K preparedness (As a unified command, SPACECOM is a joint
command of the Army Space Command, the Navy Space Command, and
the Air Force Space Command. It is in the Air Force section of
this paper because the Air Force Space Command is responsible
for approximately 95% of the information systems used by SPACECOM,
including the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
Network, which provides North America with early warning of oncoming
ballistic missiles [Def98a].). As of September of last year, SPACECOM
had not only not started fixing the bug in its systems, but did
not even have a written management plan to address the problem.
The Inspector General appropriately issued this statement last
September when it reported on the command's readiness: "Unless
SPACECOM, along with the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Defense
agencies make further progress on mitigating Y2K risks, SPACECOM
may be unable to fully execute its mission without undue disruption"
[Def98a]. Statements like this prompted
reaction from an unnamed SPACECOM official to remark that 90%
of SPACECOM's systems have met DOD milestones for compliance.
As of March, 1998, SPACECOM had identified only six mission-critical
systems in its control. There are sure to be more, as the following
anecdote illustrates: "By all accounts, Cheyenne Mountain
[where SPACECOM is based] holds a lot of computing power. There
are no furnaces in the entire Cheyenne Mountain complex; it is
warmed by distributing excess heat from the computer systems"
[Def98a].
In October of last year, the Air Combat Command, a major command of the Air Force, performed the force's first tests in which the millennium rollover was simulated in software. Four systems in particular were slated for inspection, because of their mission-critical nature. The four were the Theater Deployable Communications, Network Control Center-Deployed, Network Operations Security Center-Deployed and Joint Air Operations Center. Theater Deployable Communications includes all the voice, data, messaging and video systems that allow bases to communicate with remote fighters. A staggering 290,000 "infrastructure items" maintained by Air Combat Command will potentially be affected by the Y2K problem, according to Teresa Salazar, Air Combat Command Y2K Program Chief. Of these, 31,000 have been labeled mission critical. Apparently, the testing last October went well, but the results are still be studied [Atk98].
The first major weapon system to successfully complete its end-to-end Y2K test testing phase was the B-1 Bomber. Engineers and pilots from the B-lB System Program Office, the Boeing Company, the 419th Flight Test Squadron at Edwards AFB in California, and the 46th Test Group at Holloman AFB in New Mexico participated in the test run of an entire B-1 system. From ground tests of GPS reception to flight tests of weapons release, terrain following, and navigation, simulating the new year posed no problems for the bomber. All systems checked out [Per98b].
7.2 Budget
As of October, 1996, the Air Force was expecting its Y2K effort
to cost in the $300 million - $500 million range [Aer96].
That number was increased to $1.2 billion in December of 1998
[AFNS98].
As is the case for every sector affected by Y2K, the DOD has concerns not only for its systems developed internally, but those purchased from outside vendors. Be it a Patriot missile from Raytheon or an off-the-shelf operating system from Microsoft, the DOD is reliant on the Y2K compliance of all systems developed by outside parties. The Y2K Management plan addresses this issue not in its main body, but an Appendix entitled "Contracts, Legal Issues, and Waivers." It states that:
The appendix also encourages reviewing license agreements for all third-party software and contacting vendors with maintenance agreements past January 1, 2000 to request Y2K fixes. As is consistent with the rest of the management plan, the responsibility for insuring vendor compliance lies with the individual armed service, agency and DOD component.
We visited the Y2K disclosure pages of three major defense contractors: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon to assess their Y2K initiatives.
Two of the sites, Boeing's and Lockheed Martin's, make a statement that the information in their pages constitutes year 2000 readiness disclosure in accordance with the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act.
8.1 Boeing
The Boeing company, in addition to manufacturing commercial and private airplanes produces military aircraft, space systems, and missles and tactical weapons. In 1997 it merged with McDonnell Douglas also a leading producer of commercial transports, combat aircraft and space vehicles.
Boeing appeared to be the best-prepared and furthest along in its Y2K efforts of the three companies we examined. Its general information page states the following:
"Almost all Boeing business areas, applications, operating systems, utilities and databases on all sizes of hardware platforms are affected by the Year 2000 issue. Not only computer applications and their hardware are affected. The Year 2000 also has an impact on embedded microchips in each of our products, as well as in our manufacturing equipment, facilities management systems, security systems and so forth. Date fields, used to identify the year in computer software, hardware and embedded microchips, must be modified either by interpretation or expansion techniques to solve this problem."
The Boeing initiative began far before that of the DOD. They
have been working since 1993; they originally had an estimated
165 million lines of code to assess, which rose to 250 million
after their merger with McDonnell Douglas. They are using a familiar
methodology of six phases: inventory
assessment, planning, conversion, testing, and implementation.
Though on March 4, 1999 Boeing's Y2K page claimed that they would
be fully compliant and tested by December 31, 1998, this statement
no longer appears on their page [Boe99].
8.2 Lockheed Martin.
Among Lockheed Martin's more well-known products are the F-16 Fighting Falcon, the Space Shuttle External Tank and THAAD, mentioned earlier.
The Lockheed Martin effort started in 1996 and they estimated about 185 million lines of code to assess. They also have a six-phase approach: awareness, assessment, validation, implementation, and post implementation. [LMCO99]
In a quarterly disclosure letter available as a PDF file from the site, Lockheed Martin estimated around $75-$100 total spending on Y2K in 1998. They also provide a figure of about 105 million lines of code that needed fixing out of the 185 million lines that were assessed. They reported 98% of systems converted, tested and returned to production by the end of 1998. They foresee a change in their Y2K program for 1999, a move away from fixing problems to focusing on contingency planning. Frighteningly enough, the name of the file with the disclosure letter was Y2KDisclosure_012999_update.pdf, a non-compliant date format [LMCO99a].
8.3 Raytheon
Raytheon Company consists of Raytheon Systems Company, Raytheon Commercial Group, Raytheon Aircraft Company, Raytheon Engineers & Constructors, and Raytheon Systems Limited. They focus on defense and commercial electronics, engineering and construction, and business aviation and special mission aircraft. One of their most well-known products is the Patriot missile, widely publicized in the Gulf War. In 1997 they merged with Hughes Aircraft. Raytheon is the third largest defense contractor in the U.S., and one of the largest in the world.
Raytheon was the only of the three pages we visited that had
a link from the main page to a Y2K site. They have a trade-marked
methodology, "How To 2000," which they advertise as
being publicly available online and in bookstores. When you get
past the hype, their Y2K effort appears no different than those
of the other defense contractors, and their page in fact has the
least detailed information. Their approach is a familiar one:
planning and awareness, inventory, triage, detailed assessment,
testing, resolution, and deployment. Their Frequently Asked Questions
page deals only with Y2K in general, not Y2K at Raytheon. There
is not information about numbers of systems or lines of code,
and the most detailed information they present in terms of when
they will be ready is that "The 'Raytheon Ready 2000' project
is scheduled for completion by 1999" [Ray99].
9.1 Russia
Russia began its Y2K relationship with the United States in
June of last year when it assured Gen. Eugine E. Habiger, commander
of U.S. Strategic Command, that it would have total control over
its nuclear arsenal come January 1, 2000. He announced to the
American press that Russia informed that its arsenal was completely
bug free [AD98]. Further, our former Cold-War
adversary stated emphatically, through Defense Minister Marshal
Igor Sergeyev, that no problems will arise in the country's vast
stockpile of long range arms [Per98].
But Russia's approach to Y2K preparation began to change last
December, when NATO presented Russia with American fears that
possible power outages in Russia would be seen as attacks made
by the U.S. Such a scenario, according to American strategists,
could result in Russian launches of nuclear weapons, capable of
reaching North America [Per98c]. Strategists
note that Russian military doctrine holds that an American nuclear
attack on the country will be preceded by an attack on its information
systems [Lyn98]. This concern has been fueled
by Russia's recent proposal to the United Nations that an international
anti-information-warfare treaty be ratified. Russia is increasingly
aware of its vulnerability to computer attacks made by foreign
countries, and the U.S. does not want to be suspected as a culprit,
if systems fail at the New Year.
The latest change to Russia's approach came last month, when
it asked for $3 billion in aid from the U.S. and NATO to take
care of its Y2K concerns. Many U.S. officials are stilled concerned
about Russia's cavalier attitude toward the problem. Deputy Defense
Secretary John Hamre says he feels "some nervousness"
about Russia's ability to fix its computer systems [Bos99]. But
one of Russia's main concerns is that some nuclear systems might
go into a test routine if radar screens go blank. These procedures
are reportedly very difficult to stop [Bos99].
In the end, the U.S. role in Russia's encounter with the Y2K
problem may be that of humanitarian aid provider. Many U.S. officials
believe that Russia will simply not be able to cope with the failures
and outages caused by the bug, requiring the U.S. to step in and
help with food and medicine distribution, medical care, and evacuation,
if necessary stop [Bos99].
9.2 Other Nations
Countries with which the U.S. has dealt extensively in mutual Y2K preparation efforts include Canada, Thailand, Israel, and the United Kingdom.
In January of this year, the Canadian government released its
plans for the aptly Operation Abacus, under which the Canadian
army, navy and air force will be on alert for three months after
the New Year. 14,500 full-time troops and 4,000 reservists will
be on alert to deploy to anywhere in the country, at a moment's
notice [May99]. Canadian Deputy Chief of
Defence Staff, Col. Charles Lemieux, notes that Abacus is not
founded on the idea that the millennium bug will result in national
catastrophe. The idea is to be able to respond quickly and ably
to localized disruptions in services such as power and water.
One concern, however, is the ripple effect that is bound to result
from the failure of one integral part of some supply chain causing
the failure of another integral part of that supply chain. Unchecked,
this sort of shockwave could present the Canadian military with
significant difficulties [May99].
Thailand has been working on the Y2K problem since early 1998,
but was stymied early by the fact that even under emergency circumstances,
the country's legislature cannot pass a budget in fewer than 12
months. This set implementation back considerably, but inventory
of the country's problems was accomplished without a passed budget.
Most of the Royal Thai Army and Air Force computers are old Intel
486 machines, which are known to be Y2K non-compliant. The services
are in the process of upgrading to Pentium-based computers, running
WindowsNT [New99].
Israel's military is facing an uphill battle against the millennium
bug, as well. Brig Nissim Alfiya, head of the Israel Defense Force's
Computerisation Division stated in July of last year that the
government is concerned about the progress the military is making
with regard to Y2K preparedness [JDW98].
Fortunately, fixes have already begun being implemented for the
military' scritical systems such as communications and information
systems, but civilian utilities could bear the brunt of the bug's
force. The government's goal is total independence of the military's
utilities and information systems from those of the rest of the
country. If anything is going to work in Israel come January 1,
2000, it will be owned by the military [JDW98].
As of December last year, nearly 90% of the critical computer systems in the British Navy were not Y2K compliant [Per98d]. Further, more than 80% of mission-critical systems at the Defence Ministry's Heaedquarters had not yet been checked for Y2K compliance. As a result, Dave Knight, Chairman of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, has called on Britain and all other nuclear-capable nations to detach their nuclear warheads from ships and keep them on land for a sufficient period of time after the New Year to conclusively determine whether they are safe to be placed back on board [Per98d].
10.1 Summary
The Department of Defense Y2K effort has been guided by its Year 2000 Management plan, which outlines methodology, contingency plans, and responsibilities. There is a five-phased approach to compliance: awareness, assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation. Each armed service, DOD component and agency is responsible for its own Y2K initiative. Although specific information on defense systems is scarce, it is clear that almost every system in the military is dependent on dates, from embedded chips in weapons systems, to internal clocks in vehicles, to intelligence databases, to logistics systems, and the like. There are three tiers of system classifications: mission-critical, mission-essential, and non-mission-critical. Since the beginning of its effort, the DOD has focused almost exclusively on fixing mission-critical systems, and only recently on testing contingency plans. The DOD has been criticized by auditors numerous times on the slowness of its effort. For close to two years Congressman Stephen Horn has given the DOD unsatisfactory quarterly grades for its efforts. The GAO and Defense Department Inspector General has also found the Department's efforts inadequate on numerous occasions. The DOD have reclassified and re-estimated their number of mission-critical systems at every quarter. The DOD Y2K budget has also risen every quarter, most recently to $2.5 billion, with the most money going to the Air Force, then the Navy, then the Army. Only in the last five months has the work picked up, with compliant systems rising from 21% to 52% in the last few months of 1999, and this is probably due to a threat from the Secretary of Defense to enact a moratorium on new software development. The armed services have been equally slow, despite well-publicized successful tests of major weapons systems. Major defense contractors seem on top of the effort, having started to pay attention to the problem far before the DOD, although the specific information they provide in their disclosures is vague. On the international defense front, as is true for most other sectors, other countries are far behind the United States in terms of preparation. Russia has been a major focus of American press in this respect; Russian defense only acknowledged its Y2K problem toward the end of 1998 and is now asking for help from both NATO and the United States. Reports on other countries' military Y2K preparedness are terse and vague.
10.2 Predictions
Over the past two years The Department of Defense has been criticized for the slowness of its Y2K efforts, accused of misrepresenting the number of compliant systems, received more than three successive quarterly bad marks by an auditing House Subcommittee, and threatened by its top official in order to motivate its Y2K initiative. Thus it is hard to know what to believe when, at the end of January 1999, the DOD declared 84% of its mission-critical systems to be compliant.
There is no question that the armed services, defense agencies and DOD components have an immense number of critical systems to overhaul, but its effort has been plagued at every step by the denial, underestimation, and disorganization in the handling of the Y2K problem that is inevitable in an agency its size. Will the DOD have all its systems, critical or otherwise compliant by January 1, 2000? Probably not. Will the security of the United States be compromised come January 1, 2000? Probably not. Although slow, the DOD's effort has not been incompetent. The most critical of its "mission-critical" systems will have certainly have been made compliant and tested before 2000 rolls around. The greater concern is for those errors that occur in second- and third-tier systems within the Department, and in external systems that interface with DOD systems. It is heartening to see the DOD finally focusing significant effort testing its contingency plans because when the new year rolls around, "defense" may mean providing support and disaster relief to those who were even less prepared.
Mr. Holt would like to thanks Mr. Katz. Mr. Katz would like to thank Mr. Holt.
| [ AD98] | Russian nuclear C2 seen Y2K safe. Aerospace Daily, 186(58):455 June 22, 1998. |
| [ Aer96] | USAF wants 'Year 2000' computer problem fixed by FY '99. Aerospace Daily, 180(5):40, October 7, 1996. |
| [ Aer98] | Air Combat Command in first hands-on Y2K test. Aerospace Daily, 188(6):47, October 8, 1998. |
| [ AFNS98] | PENTAGON INCREASES COST ESTIMATE OF Y2K FIX. ARMED FORCES NEWSWIRE SERVICE, December 1, 1998. |
| [ AFNS99] | ARMY HELICOPTERS PASS Y2K TESTING. ARMED FORCES NEWSWIRE SERVICE, January 14, 1999. |
| [ AFNS99a] | NELLIS RANGE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETES Y2K TEST. ARMED FORCES NEWSWIRE SERVICE, January 25, 1999. |
| [ AFNS99b] | Y2K BUG SO FAR PRESENTS NO MAJOR DISRUPTIONS FOR PAC FLEET. ARMED FORCES NEWSWIRE SERVICE, February 16, 1999. |
| [ Atk98] | David Atkinson. INTEROPERABILITY WITH ALLIES STILL CRUCIAL, ESMOND SAYS. Defense Daily, 200(52), November 3, 1998. |
| [ Atk99] | David Atkinson. AIR FORCE MOVES TO ENSURE Y2K IN ITS PLANNING SYSTEM. Defense Daily, 201(30), February 17, 1999. |
| [ Bar98] | Stephen Barr. DoD Pentagon Faulted on Year 2000 Reports. The Washington Post, A25, June 12, 1998. |
| [ Bau98] | Neil Baumgardner. B-1 BOMBER, ARMY AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS PASS Y2K TESTS. Defense Daily, 200(52), November 3, 1998. |
| [ Ben97] | Bryan Bender. DoD COMPLETES PLAN FOR FIXING COMPUTERS BY 2000. Defense Daily, 195(31), May 13, 1997. |
| [ Ben97a] | Bryan Bender. DoD URGED TO RETIRE OLD COMPUTERS NOT WORTH FIXES. Defense Daily, 195(50), June 10, 1997. |
| [ Ben97b] | Bryan Bender. PENTAGON's 'YEAR 2000' COST ESTIMATE JUMPS. Defense Daily, 196(28), August 8, 1997. |
| [ Ben98] | Bryan Bender. USA to test top systems for 'bug'. Jane's Defence Weekly, 29(21):8, May 27, 1998. |
| [ Ben98a] | Bryan Bender. White Sands range passes Year 2000 technology checks. Jane's Defence Weekly, 30(1), July 8, 1998. |
| [ Boe99] | Boeing Year 2000 Homepage. http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/y2k/ , Visited March 15, 1999. |
| [ Bos99] | Russia asks $3b in aid for computer glitch. The Boston Globe, February 4, 1999. |
| [ Bre98] | BOB BREWIN. DOD stages Year 2000 war game. Federal Computer Week, NOVEMBER 23, 1998. |
| [ Bre99] | BOB BREWIN. DOD
predicts success in preparations for Y2K.Federal Computer Week, NOVEMBER 23, 1998. |
| [ C4I98] | MORE THAN 200,000 ARMY SYSTEMS ARE NOT Y2K COMPLIANT. C4I News, 5(32) April 23, 1998. |
| [C4I98a] | PENTAGON CONSIDERING STANDING UP 1,250 Y2K CERTIFICATION FORCE. C4I News, 5(32) April 23, 1998. |
| [ C4I98b] | WHITE SANDS TO CONDUCT YEAR 2000 TEST ON JULY 2, 1998. C4I News, 5(37) July 2, 1998. |
| [ C4I98c] | NAVY Y2K EFFORTS INADEQUATE, GAO SAYS. C4I News, 5(38) July 16, 1998. |
| [ C4I98d] | IG REPORT SAYS DSWA RESPONSE TO Y2K PROBLEM INADEQUATE. C4I News, 5(47) November 19, 1998. |
| [ C4I99] | AIR FORCE VALIDATES AMRAAM FOR Y2K, BUILDS ISSUE INTO TESTING. C4I News, 6(1) January 14, 1999. |
| [ Cah98] | George Cahlink. ARMY WILL SPEND $366 MILLION ON Y2K COMPUTER FIX. Defense Daily, 199(3), April 3, 1998. |
| [ Cah98a] | George Cahlink. ARMY YEAR 2000 CONTINGENCY PLANS DUE BY JUNE. Defense Daily, 199(18), April 24, 1998. |
| [ Cah98b] | George Cahlink. GAO : ARMY'S YEAR 2000 COMPUTER FIX EFFORT 'INEFFECTIVE'. Defense Daily, 199(45), June 3, 1998. |
| [ Cra98] | James W. Crawley. DoD Pentagon in trenches of technology. The San Diego Union-Tribune, A-1, December 6, 1998. |
| [ Def98] | LOCKHEED MARTIN DELIVERS Y2K SOFTWARE TO AIR FORCE. Defense Daily, 199(89), August 5, 1998. |
| [ Def98a] | SPACECOM NEEDS TO ADDRESS CRITICAL Y2K CONCERNS, IG SAYS. Defense Daily, 200(9), September 1, 1998. |
| [ Def98b] | TOMAHAWK MEETS Y2K TESTS. Defense Daily, 200(33), October 6, 1998. |
| [ Def99] | AIR FORCE TESTS F-15, AMRAAM FOR Y2K. Defense Daily, 201(2), January 6, 1999. |
| [ DOD96] | The Department of Defense Organizational Structure. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ofg/os_dod.html, Visited March 15, 1999. |
| [ DOD96a] | Department of Defense Organization Chart. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ofg/dod.pdf, December 1996. |
| [ DOD98] | Department of Defense Year 2000 Management Plan. http://www.dtic.mil/c3i/y2k/mgntplan/title.html, December 1998. |
| [ GCN98] | Cost estimate for 2000 on rise. Government Computer News, p. 20, September 28, 1998. |
| [ Gou98] | SCOTT R. GOURLEY. US Army proves air defence Y2K capabilities. Jane's Defence Weekly, 30(18) November 4, 1998. |
| [ Gou99] | SCOTT R. GOURLEY. US Army demonstrates Y2K missile compatibility. Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 3(1) January 1, 1999 |
| [ IAA98] | U.S. Army Redoubles Efforts To Avoid Flunking Y2K. Inside Aviation/Aerospace IT, 2(11):1 June 3, 1998. |
| [ IAA98a] | AF Maintenance System Gets Y2K Certification. Inside Aviation/Aerospace IT, 2(22):3 November 4, 1998. |
| [ IAA98b] | AF Combat Support Systems To Be Y2K-Certified This Month Inside Aviation/Aerospace IT, 2(25):3 December 16, 1998. |
| [ Jag99] | Peter de Jager. Y2K: So many bugs... so little time. Scientific American, 280(1):88-93, January 1999. |
| [ JDW98] | Forces will suffer if Israel does not tackle Y2K bug. Jane's Defence Weekly, 30(2), July 22, 1998. |
| [ Lew98] | NICOLE LEWIS. Defense Science Board slams DOD's Year 2000 compliance efforts. Federal Computer Week, FEBRUARY 26, 1998. |
| [ Lew98a] | NICOLE LEWIS. Rep.
Horn gives feds a failing grade for Y2K effort Federal Computer Week, MARCH 4, 1998. |
| [ LMCO99] | Lockheed Martin Y2K. http://y2k.external.lmco.com, Visited March 15, 1999. |
| [LMCO99a] | Lockeed Martin Year 2000 readiness disclosure. http://y2k.external.lmco.com/files4/sites/y2k/news/Y2KDisclosure_012999_update.pdf, January 21 1999. |
| [ Lyn98] | Colum Lynch. Y2K bug worries US, Russia. The Boston Globe, December 12, 1998. |
| [ May99] | KATHRYN MAY. Forces prepare for nationwide: Y2K deployment $ 386M program would be peacetime's largest operation. THE OTTAWA CITIZEN,, January 16, 1999. |
| [ Mic99] | David Michlovitz. USA closes in on mission-critical Y2K deadline. Jane's Defence Weekly, 31(4), January 27, 1999. |
| [ New98] | Thai Military Battles Against Year 2000 Problem. Newsbytes, , September 7, 1998. |
| [ OMB99] | Office of Management and Budget. http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OMB/html/ombhome.html, Visited on March 15, 1999. |
| [ Per98] | RUSSIA - SAYS ITS MISSILES ARE Y2K SAFE. Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, August 13, 1998. |
| [ Per98a] | USA - SATELLITES, ICBMS READY FOR Y2K. Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, October 22, 1998. |
| [ Per98b] | USA - USA - B-1B DEMONSTRATES Y2K COMPLIANCE. Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, November 3, 1998. |
| [ Per98c] | RUSSIA - TO WORK WITH NATO ON Y2K BUG AMID NUCLEAR FEARS. Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, December 9, 1998. |
| [ Per98d] | UK - NAVY NOT READY FOR Y2K. Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, December 11, 1998. |
| [ PRN97] | Y2C Contracted for Canadian Department of National Defense Year 2000 Project. PR Newswire, December 11, 1997. |
| [ Ray99] | Raytheon Year 2000. http://www.raytheon.com/y2k/, Visited March 15, 1999 |
| [ Sla98] | Gregory Slabodkin. How ready is Defense? Government Computer News, 17(17):1 June 15, 1998. |
| [ Sla98a] | Gregory Slabodkin. Cohen: Fix date code or I'll halt new app efforts. Government Computer News, 17(27):6 August 24, 1998. |
| [ Sla98b] | Gregory Slabodkin. Defense rethinks Y2K strategy. Government Computer News, 17(29): 59 September 7, 1998. |
| [ Sla98c] | Gregory Slabodkin. IG berates Space Command. Government Computer News, 17(31): 50 September 21, 1998. |
| [ Til98] | L. SCOTT TILLETT. Rep. Horn gives agencies 'F' for Y2K work. Federal Computer Week, JUNE 2, 1998. |
| [ Wol97] | Frank Wolfe. PENTAGON NOT ON TRACK TO FIX Y2K PROBLEM UNTIL 2012, HORN SAYS. Defense Daily, 197(49), December 12, 1997. |
| [ Wol98] | Frank Wolfe. MONEY APPOINTS YEAR 2000 OVERSIGHT DIRECTOR. Defense Daily, 197(49), March 18, 1998. |
| [ Wol98a] | Frank Wolfe. NAVY ESTIMATES $421 MILLION FOR YEAR 2000 FIX. Defense Daily, 199(16), April 22, 1998. |