The Communications Industry

Josh Bandur and Christian Bennett

March 15, 1999

i. Abstract

The Communications Industry, which includes such areas as telephone, broadcast, cable, wireless, satellite and emergency communications, is an important component of modern society. Like all other industries that rely on modern technology, the Communications Industry is vulnerable to the Year 2000 Technology Problem (Y2K). While much of the basic communications infrastructure is not date or time dependent and should not be directly impacted by Y2K, there is the strong possibility of failures arising from subtle, indirect causes. Peripheral systems controlling such operations as billing or maintenance may contain Y2K errors and could indirectly cause communications network failures. In addition, external dependencies may also prove critical in the coming millenium. To combat these problems, most industry players are conducting extensive testing of individual network elements, as well as interoperability tests. There is a great deal of industry-wide cooperation and information sharing. Most problems are being dealt with in a timely fashion and the Year 2000 event is expected to cause inconveniences but not complete network failures.

ii. Contents

1. Introduction
2. Wireline Telecommunications
    2.1. Telecom Background
    2.2. Telecom Issues
    2.3. Telecom Preparations
    2.4. Other Organizations
    2.5. Telecom Contingency Planning
    2.6. Telecom Outlook
3. Satellite Communication
    3.1. Satellite Background
    3.2. Satellite Issues
    3.3. Satellite Outlook
4. Cable Networks
    4.1. Cable Background
    4.2. Cable Issues
    4.3. Cable Preparations
5. Broadcast Networks
    5.1. Broadcast Background
    5.2. Broadcast Issues
    5.3. Broadcast Preparations
    5.4. Broadcast Outlook
6. Wireless Communication
    6.1. Wireless Background
    6.2. Wireless Issues
    6.3. Wireless Outlook
7. Emergency Communication Systems
    7.1. Emergency Background
    7.2. Emergency Issues
    7.3. Network Contingency Planning
    7.4. Emergency Outlook
8. Summary
9. References

1. Introduction

Six major sectors comprise the Communications Industry in the United States, accounting for thousands of individual companies:

Wireline Telecommunications ó Responsible for general telephony, this sector includes the five long distance carriers, six regional bell operating companies and over 1400 small telephone carriers;
Wireless Communications ó There are over 2 million wireless licenses, including hundreds of cell phone companies, paging service providers, public safety systems and private business radio systems;
Satellite Communications ó There are presently sixteen communications satellite providers;
Broadcast ó There are five major television networks, and thousands of broadcast radio stations;
Cable ó The country's cable service is provided by over 11000 cable service companies;
Emergency Communications ó This sector involves a variety of systems and elements of each of the other sectors.

In addition, there are more than 4500 Internet Service Providers, providing internet access using telephone and cable systems [US-1-98].

Almost all other industries rely in some way, directly or indirectly, on the Communications Industry for their daily operations. A disruption in any of the communications sectors could paralyze businesses, individuals and governments. It is for this reason that it is essential that the Communications Industry be properly prepared for the coming millenium and the technology problems that are likely to come with it. If there still exist systems that are non-compliant, they will most likely begin to fail on or around January 1, 2000. Already, one important date, January 1, 1999, has passed with few major problems; however, instances of failures in navigation and communication systems on ships [DY99], as well as credit-card transaction difficulties, indicate that the Year 2000 (Y2K) will not pass as a complete non-event. By now, many of the most glaring Year 2000 software glitches have been remedied by vendors, so it is more likely that any catastrophes that occur in the coming millennium will be the result of more subtle failures, probably involving indirect causes and interdependent systems.

The Communications Industry's extensive use of modern technology and computer systems means that it is vulnerable to direct Y2K bugs, while its vastly complex, interconnected nature makes it vulnerable to indirect or interdependency failures. To combat these problems, the industry is expected to spend significant amounts of money for testing and remediations. Telecom alone is expected to spend almost $2 billion for Y2K [CD99].

We will take a look at each of the sectors of the Communications Industry, to see what Year 2000 issues they face and how they are prepared to deal with them. We will begin by analyzing the Telecommunications Industry in depth, as many of its problems are shared by other industry sectors. Then, we will discuss some of the special concerns of each of the other sectors. We will also take a close look at emergency communications.

2. Wireline Telecommunications

2.1. Telecom Background

The telephone system consists of a vast, interconnected network of Local Exchange Carriers (LEC), Inter-exchange Carriers (IXC) and Private Branch Exchanges (PBX). The LECs handle local and regional calling, and include the six large Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOC) that were formed after the breakup of AT&T, as well as over 1400 additional, small local carriers. The IXCs form connections between these LECs to handle long-distance calls, and are comprised of the five major long-distance companies. The PBXs include on-site switching equipment, such as private switchboards for particular buildings or businesses [Rot-2-98].

All of the above elements are required for a single long-distance wireline call. The process for connecting an ordinary long-distance call is as follows:

The caller picks up the handset;
The switch detects that the phone is picked up and immediately sends a dial tone;
The caller dials the number;
The tones or pulses are received by the switch and it routes the call, based on the area code and three-digit exchange;
The call goes from a local tandem to an access tandem;
The call is handed off to the inter-exchange carrier;
The IXC hands off to an LEC at the other end;
The call proceeds through a series of local switches until it eventually reaches the PBX at the destination and is dispatched to the appropriate receiver [US-1-98].

Additional processing may be added to this process to provide for additional services. For example, 800 numbers require some special processing at the first switch. When it recognizes that an 800 number has been dialed, the switch queries a Service Control Point (SCP), which uses a database to translate the 800 number into an actual destination phone number. From there, the call proceeds as normal, using the new mapped number. Scheduled-routing-change service is another service that uses a similar query. For instance, a companyís 24-hour customer-service hotline may require calls to be routed differently for different times of day or different days of the week [US-1-98]. Other examples of special services requiring additional processing are call-forwarding messages and call-waiting.

In terms of infrastructure, each company has a variety of hardware and software components. For example, Bell Atlantic, one of the RBOCs, has over 350 types of network devices, deployed tens of thousands of times, 1200 software applications, 88000 PCs, 800 mid-range computers and 40 mainframes [US-1-98]. Network devices for a single company may include 1400 to 1600 switches, 30 to 50 signal transfer points, 5 to 60 service control points, thousands of transport component systems, and many element management systems and operating systems [CD99].

Therefore, the telecommunications network consists of a number of elements, all working in concert to connect calls. The basic call-connection process is carried out by simple routing switches and is a relatively straightforward series of hand-offs among LECs, IXCs and PBXs; however, additional layers of processing may be added for other, special services. As such, the Telecommunications Industry is certainly reliant on modern technology and computer systems, rendering it vulnerable to the Year 2000 problem.

2.2. Telecom Issues

For the most part, the telecommunications system is appreciably robust. The network has been designed for "unfailing reliability," and thorough regression tests of all network elements are routinely performed [US-2-98]. Of particular advantage to the telecommunications network is its dynamic nature. Calls are routed as they are made, so they can easily be routed around isolated problem nodes in the network. In addition, there are practically no date or time dependencies in any of the switches that control the call-connection process. This means that the network is in no way directly susceptible to the Year 2000 bug. Of greatest concern, then, to the industry are the indirect problems which may arise because of peripheral systems, irregular operating conditions or outside dependencies [US-1-98].

While the fundamental call-connection process may be compliant, it is not immune to failures caused by other, peripheral systems within telecom companies. The most important of these systems are the Operational Support Systems or OSS. The OSS control important telecom functions outside of the simple connection of calls. These services are often date or time dependent and can be divided into the areas of service management, service billing and service assuranceóthe third being the area of greatest concern. Service management involves establishing and canceling telephone company services, as well as some of the special services described above, like 800 service and scheduled routing changes. Service billing systems track money owed or paid for services rendered. Year 2000 errors in either of these first two systems will probably cause nuisances like billing problems or the interruption of special call-connection services. While such problems might inconvenience telecom companies and customers, they should not greatly impact the integrity of the basic network or the ability to connect ordinary calls. On the other hand, service assurance may involve fault detection systems and maintenance scheduling. These systems use date and time information to log errors in network devices and to track and schedule maintenance. If these systems fail, problems in network switches may go unnoticed and/or unfixed. Of important note is the strong possibility that such problems will not cause immediate network failures, and instead will contribute to a slow deterioration of the system. In fact, this slow degradation of the network means that Year 2000 telecom catastrophes may not occur until well after the January 1, 2000 deadline [US-1-98].

Even if all telecom systems, including the OSS, are compliant, failures are still possible due to unusual operating parameters created by the Y2K event. In the weeks leading up to the date change, many people are expected to call banks, health care providers, and so forth, inquiring about their levels of preparedness [Bea98]. During the date change, people may call from earlier time zones to those that have already made the transition to see if anything has happened [CD99]. There will, in fact, be a thirteen hour window between the time that Australia feels the effects of the date transition and when the US is impacted [FCC-E98], which could be exploited to shut down safety-critical systems with unforeseen problems. For example, if Australian nuclear power plants mysteriously begin to melt down at the stroke of midnight, December 31, 1999, then plants in the US can safely shut down their systems before they experience the same fateóprovided the phones are still in order and the power plants are able to communicate. In the aftermath of the date change, people will likely make calls to assess the damage. Each of these situations could present the network with a volume of calls so massive that widespread failures could occur. Furthermore, in the event that part of the network does go down and calls to a particular country or region fail to complete, there will likely be re-dial attempts, which will place an increased burden on one central office switch [Pow98], perhaps causing additional failures.

Finally, there exist outside dependencies beyond telecom control. Gerard Roth, Vice President of Technology Programs at GTE, points out, "It should not go unnoticed that the largest external risk to the operational integrity of the Public-Switched Telephone Network is the continued availability of electric power across the national power grid" [Rot-1-98]. This is ostensibly a major concern, because the network cannot possibly function without power. At least one electric company, Avista Corporation, reports, "We have yet to find a single embedded controller or subsystem anywhere within our generation or transmission infrastructure that would have hampered our ability to generate or deliver energy to our customers" [PR99]. Such assurances should not be accepted out of hand, however, as the power industry is subject to the same subtle interdependencies as telecom, and is equally likely to suffer from indirect failures.

To give some idea of the actual threat some of these problems pose to the industry, an October 1997 report by the Presidentís Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection cited two recent examples of widespread telecom failure,

"The susceptibility of the current generation of switching equipment to software based disruption was demonstrated in the collapse of AT&T's long distance service in January 1990. A line of incorrect code caused a cascading failure of 114 electronic switching systems .... (Again) the potential for software-based disruption of common channel signaling was demonstrated in June 1991, when phone service in several cities, including 6.7 million lines in Washington, DC, was disrupted for several hours due to a problem with the network's Signaling System 7 protocol. The problem was ultimately traced to a single mis-typed character in the protocol code" [qt. in Bin98].

2.3. Telecom Preparations

Very little of the Communication Industryís Y2K effort involves actual conversion of programs or equipment; instead, the industry is mostly involved in gathering information and testing [Rot-1-98]. To ease this burden, the Telecommunications Industry has adopted a policy of information sharing and cooperative testing. Such a policy helps prevent duplicated effort, promotes the sharing of solutions and alerts companies to problems that they may not have considered. In addition, it reduces customer anxiety to see such an industry-wide, concerted effort [US-1-98].

For the most part, telecom companies have been very cooperative in sharing information on their Y2K problems and efforts. An important consideration that companies have in their willingness to disclose information has been legal liability [Pow98]; however, the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act has eased this problem by limiting liability for disclosure. In addition, the Federal Communications Commission has been active in promoting intra-industry cooperation.

Interoperability testing is also an important part of the Telecommunications Industryís preparations. Simply testing one component of the network at a time does not ensure that it will function correctly as a complete system, therefore it is critical that the network be thoroughly tested for interoperability among the LECs, IXCs, PBXs, and so forth. In particular, there is the concern that any date or time information that is passed between network devices must be usable by the devices at both ends. In addition, the network is composed of equipment from a variety of vendors, so it is necessary to verify that the different devices will function correctly together [Lis98].

There are three potential drawbacks to the Telecommunication Industryís solutions: Ownership, Mathematics and the impossibility of live-network testing. First of all, ownership of the entire network is spread among a large number of individual companies, and therefore many groups are responsible for bringing it to compliance. Coordinating these efforts may prove to be one of the most difficult aspects of the problem. In particular, each company may have its own priorities for fixing problems, and therefore uniform compliance cannot be assured. Second, there are too many permutations of network elements to test them all. Compounding this problem is the fact that the dynamic nature of call routing prevents our even predicting how certain calls will be routed. This means that we cannot specifically test, for example, if 911 calls will go through, because it is impossible to know exactly what route such calls will take. (In some cases this problem has been circumvented with the use of direct, dedicated calling lines.) Finally, the telecom networks are in perpetual use, making it difficult to conduct live-network testing. At best, small portions can be taken off-line at one time without disrupting service [Rot-1-98, Rot-2-98].

2.4. Other Organizations

Other organizations involved with the Communications Industry in their Y2K-compliance efforts include governmental regulatory bodies, as well as private research institutions. Three organizations of particular importance to the effort are the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and Bellcore.

The FCC is playing an important role in facilitating the development and dissemination of information among telecom companies. They have adopted an engagement approach, rather than a regulatory one, both as an effort to encourage the cooperation of those within the industry, and because the short time period remaining precludes standard regulatory procedures [Pow98]. The first part of this approach has been a letter-writing campaign. The FCC sent out over 200 letters to communications companies, inquiring about their Y2K efforts. Telecomís response has been the best in the industry, with all twenty companies contacted responding. The FCC has also organized eight international informational forums in an effort to promote information sharing [US-1-98]. Of particular concern to the FCC are smaller carriers which may not realize the seriousness of the Y2K problem, or may not have the resources to implement Y2K-compliance measures. In an effort to reach these smaller businesses, the FCC has been working closely with trade associations [Pow98]. Finally, if all else fails, Commissioner Powell, defense commissioner and coordinator of Y2K issues at the FCC, has unilateral power to authorize emergency frequency use or tower construction in case of network collapse [CD99].

Another big concern for the FCC is the preparedness of international carriers. The two-way nature of telecommunications means that if international networks go down, no amount of preparedness on the part of the US will make international calls go through [US-1-98]. Consequently, the FCC has been working with the International Telecommunications Union to promote foreign compliance [Pow98]. The ITU, in conjunction with the World Bank, also plans to invest money in bringing foreign countries up to Y2K compliance [CD99]. The global outlook, so far, has been poor, however; a survey by the World Bank in February revealed that only 53 of the 132 countries researched were aware of the Y2K problem at all [KCS99].

A private research agency that has been instrumental in telecom Y2K efforts is Bellcore. Bell Communications Research, or Bellcore, was established by the RBOCs as a consortium to provide engineering, administrative and other services to the Telecommunications Industry. It has been working primarily to establish standards of compliance and promote industry cooperation. The Bellcore GR2945 provides an industry specification for hardware and software compliance that telecom companies can use as a common measure [US-1-98]. In addition, Bellcore has organized the Year 2000 Telco Forum. This series of meetings among major phone carriers has been a valuable tool for information sharing and for organizing interoperability testing [Lis98].

2.5. Telecom Contingency Planning

In the event of network or other failures, the Communications Industry has a variety of contingency plans already in place. These include cooperative agreements, alternate lines of communication and alternate sources of power.

The Telecommunications Industry has a reputation for reliable service which is, in part, the result of formal and informal cooperative agreements among carriers. In the event of widespread outages, many carriers agree to share resources like supplies, portable equipment, motor vehicles and personnel, and they may arrange for temporary re-routing of traffic over another carrierís lines [CD99]. These agreements have worked very well in the past, and there is every reason to believe that they will prove effective in combating Y2K outages.

In order for telecom companies to maintain their own ability to communicate in the event of a public network failure, there exist alternate communication capabilities between critical network centers and industry parties. Dedicated lines exist between major service providers, equipment manufacturers and national security emergency preparedness operational sites. There is also the possibility of adding connectivity between software experts and switch manufacturers. Also in place is a system for communications independent of the public network, using high-frequency radio [US-1-98].

Finally, in the event of a loss of power, most telephone carriers do have batteries and generators. Each company generally has enough fuel to continue operations for several days before it will need to be re-supplied [FCC-E98]. If electrical outages persist, telecom companies will be dependent on the ability of shipping and fuel companies to deliver the needed supplies. (Of course, these companies are, in turn, dependent on telecommunications in their ability to provide these supplies.)

2.6. Telecom Outlook

Almost every other industry in the world depends in some way, directly or indirectly, on telecommunications. If the telephone network goes down, even for a short period of time, it could have serious consequences for most businesses and individuals. Some examples of problems arising from recent outages in the network include stores that could not accept credit cards, Red Cross difficulties processing blood donations and cable companies that could not process pay-per-view orders [Ken98]. A very important consequence of these dependencies is that telecom systems, in fact, need to be compliant well before the December 1999 deadline, so that those who rely on them can run tests on their own systems [US-1-98].

Most of the basic telecommunications infrastructure is free of Y2K errors; however, the possibility of network failures due to indirect causes is considerable. Telecom companies are taking steps to prevent against the indirect failures that they have thought of, like failures in their own OSS or unusual call volumesóbut it is impossible to think of everything, and it will be the failure that they did not consider that will be their undoing. Furthermore, it is very likely that the general lack of attention to Y2K in the international arena will hinder telecomís ability to continue operations in other parts of the world in the Year 2000 [US-1-98].

3. Satellite Communication

3.1. Satellite Background

"The concept of using a satellite repeater was first proposed by Arthur C. Clarke in the October 1945 issue of Wireless World. The development of powerful rockets in the mid-1950s and the simultaneous development of sensitive low-noise receiving equipment made communications satellites a realistic consideration" [Academic American Encyclopedia]. Some fifty years later, satellite systems have come to play a major role in our day-to-day lives. Satellite communications are involved in financial systems, banks, air traffic control systems, cable systems, government and the military [Ken98]. They are also a critical component of the Global Positioning System (GPS), which is used by a variety of other systems, including navigation equipment and the electric power grid. Consequently, any satellite failures due to Y2K could have wide-spread effects. For the most part, the Satellite Industry has similar concerns to those of the Telecommunications Industry; however, there are naturally a number of industry-specific concerns.

3.2. Satellite Issues

Any failures that the Satellite Communications Industry may face, come January 1, 2000, will probably be the indirect result of peripheral system errors, rather than a direct failure of primary equipment. Much like wireline telecommunications, problems will most likely manifest themselves in the ground-based control and monitoring systems [US-1-98].

Currently, the industry maintains that there are no Y2K issues with the satellite hardware itself. This is a particular concern because the cost to test or replace embedded systems in orbiting satellites would be extreme [NST99]. Fortunately, satellites typically do not use standard date and time; they use their own "satellite local time," based on a reference to the Sun. Therefore, it is believed that there will be no problems with the satellites themselves [US-1-98]. On the other hand, there are believed to be Y2K errors in the control/monitoring software used on the ground. These systems could potentially cause satellites to stray off-course, and will have to be tested and updated.

Another concern that is not specifically a Y2K problem, but is related, is the GPS rollover. The Global Positioning System uses a 20-year countdown to keep track of date and time. The next rollover date is August 21, 1999 [FCC-E98]. Although the industry does not expect any GPS-related satellite problems, they do predict the malfunction of Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) that use the GPS, which may not have been programmed to recognize the rollover. Many such GPS-dependent devices malfunctioned on January 1 of this year, foreshadowing the Y2K event yet to come. For example, many ships which had become dependent on GPS since the early seventies had system malfunctions. Old GPS devices could not understand the year 1999, and hence ceased to function. The GPS rollover may give us a valuable preview of the kinds of problems satellite communications may face with Y2K.

3.3. Satellite Outlook

Much of the initial concerns associated with the satellite industry were the large fixed costs associated with fixing hardware. Fortunately, current analysis of satellite systems suggest that little interfacing hardware will need replacement and there are no expected problems associated with Satellite hardware currently in orbit. With no known hardware issues and limited, fixable software bugs, the Satellite Communications Industry is in good condition to weather the effects of the Year 2000.

4. Cable Networks

4.1. Cable Background

The Cable Industry is composed of a number of manufacturers, vendors and service providers. Over the last several decades, massive amounts of infrastructure have been set in place in order to provide cable service to most regions nation-wide. Currently, cable networks can reach 99% of American households, giving the cable industry an important position in that coveted, yet expensive, "last mile to the home." The cable industry is an important source of televised information for areas that do not receive ordinary broadcast television, and also functions as a carrier of Emergency Alert System (EAS) transmissions. Furthermore, the cable industry has been hugely successful, amassing annual revenues in the tens of billions of dollars.

Part of this success has been a result of the large fixed cost involved in starting cable operations. The significant cable infrastructure serves as a market barrier to entryóbut may also be a considerable barrier to Y2K compliance. The sheer number of pieces of equipment that need to be examined and possibly repaired or replaced is the primary obstacle the the Y2K-compliance efforts of the Cable Industry.

4.2. Cable Issues

Almost all of the obstacles faced by the Cable Industry in their efforts for Y2K compliance involve equipment. A single cable operator may have over a thousand operational facilities containing massive amounts of equipment involved in their daily operations. Some of this equipment includes EAS equipment, commercial insertion devices, switches for shared-channel programming and automated test equipment. There is also a great deal of Customer Premises Equipment that must be considered. There is concern that vendors will not be able to replace all non-compliant cable set-top boxes in a timely fashion. Finally there are large amounts of software that control such things as billing, management, service-call logging and personnel dispatching that must be tested [FCC-C99].

The cable service operator's Y2K responsibilities are further aggravated by their reliance upon vendors. There is very little testing and repairing that the cable service providers can do themselves; instead, they must depend on vendors to identify and repair non-compliant equipment. This reliance can be a particular problem because vendors have their own unique time and resource constraints. In addition, cable operators are dependent on external service providers, such as power, telephony and satellite [FCC-C99].

4.3. Cable Preparations

The industry has made some unsuccessful efforts in coordinating Y2K readiness and awareness. In July of 1998, cable systems operators, equipment manufacturers and vendors, cable programmers and trade associations met to discuss Y2K at the Cable Services Bureau Roundtable Discussion. Very little came out of this meeting due to the general reluctance to share information due to liability concerns. The group succeeded only in identifying equipment needed for Y2K verifications. The problem equipment they specifically identified were controllers, analog/digital converters, local origination equipment, scramblers, and encoders [FCC-C99].

On the other hand, Cable Television Laboratories Inc. (CableLabs), a research center that serves the cable industry, comprised of major Multiple System Operators (MSO), has been useful in disseminating info regarding the ways that certain equipment should be replaced and/or repaired [FCC-C99].

5. Broadcast Networks

5.1. Broadcast Background

Since the beginning of broadcasting in the early 1920s, society has become dependent upon it as a means for mass communication. "Television is capable of exerting an influence that no other medium of communication can match" [Academic American Encyclopedia]. Broadcast is special in its ability to disseminate information quickly to the masses. With the Y2K event, Broadcast systems will be important for relaying emergency information. This includes the Emergency Alert System (the new version of the familiar Emergency Broadcast System), as well as the nightly news. The availability of up-to-date news may help prevent misinformation and mass panic [Ken98].

5.2. Broadcast Issues

Like the telecommunications sector, the greatest weaknesses for the Broadcasting Industry lie not in the primary equipment, but in peripheral systems. For example, transmitters are essentially "dumb" devices that do not themselves have Y2K problems, but associated equipment like remote control tower activators and cooling or de-icing systems are likely to be computer controlled and will render the transmitter useless should they fail. Exacerbating this problem are testing complications. Different units of the same piece of equipment could be part of different production batches, between which changes may have been made. Therefore it is important that each individual item be tested, even of the same model equipment [FCC-B99].

A somewhat peripheral issue that has received a seemingly unwarranted amount of attention is tower lighting. The reason tower lighting is such a concern is because improperly lit towers pose a significant risk to low flying aircraft that may collide with the towers. This would not only be of great danger to the aircraft, but would seriously impair regional broadcasting capabilities. Nonetheless, the lighting should continue to work (as long as there is power) since it is based on the amount of ambient light, not on any date or time information [FCC-B99].

5.3. Broadcast Preparations

The Broadcast Industry is working diligently to achieve Y2K compliance. Like telecom, the industry views information sharing as imperative, but individual companies have been reticent to divulge information for fear of liability [FCC-B99]. This fear of liability is reasonable given the hype surrounding potential Y2K lawsuits, but may serve as a bottleneck for getting the EAS system reliably stable come January 1.

In addition, many operators think that purchasing new equipment to make the transition from analog to digital will automatically bring them to Y2K compliance; however, the assumption that the newness of digital equipment assures Y2K compliance is not necessarily warranted [FCC-B99].

5.4. Broadcast Outlook

Broadcasting involves both input and output systems because programming must first be processed from its source and then transmitted out to the public or network affiliates [FCC-B99]. This creates a chain of dependencies, such that a failure in any one of these systems could prevent the relay of broadcast medium to the public. In particular, the dissemination of news and emergency information could be disrupted. The FCC is working closely with broadcasters to ensure that they will continue to function in the Year 2000.

6. Wireless Communication

6.1. Wireless Background

Wireless Communications is broad category, covering a variety of communication systems. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB) divides the wireless community of over 2 million licensees into three broad groups: Commercial, Private and Public Safety users. The commercial segment consists of the major cellular and paging providers. Private businesses like railroads, utilities or petroleum companies may have licensed radio systems for communication or safety. The last segment, public safety, includes radio networks used by police, fire and other safety agencies [FCC-W99].

6.2. Wireless Issues

The Wireless Telecommunications Industry is far behind wireline communications in terms of testing and preparations. In mid-February, Commissioner Powell of the FCC "berated" the wireless industry for its poor Y2K response [WTN99]. The first interoperability tests of the telecom network to include wireless telecommunications companies was conducted in February of this year. On the bright side, the tests went through with no major glitches [CD99]. For the most part, the Wireless Telecommunications Industry has no special concerns. As long as there are no problems in the interfaces with the wireline systems, their own reliability will depend directly on the integrity of the wireline network.

The majority of paging service providers began working on compliance about two years ago. One barrier to Y2K compliance is that there are a large number of small service providers and vendors who cannot afford to test or repair Y2K problems. The best tactics for these small providers is to contact vendors to see what solutions they may have. That said, the Paging Industry is not expecting to have a major Y2K disruption. Most of the problems should arise in Customer Premises Equipment, like the pagers themselves, and should only be inconveniences like incorrect time stamps [LMRN99]. On the other hand, users like doctors depend on pagers for their daily operations and a failing paging network may cause chaos or death. Furthermore, it has been seen that minor disruptions can cause major shutdowns of paging operations. For example, in early spring of 1998, a single satellite malfunction caused millions of pagers to go down [Bea98].

6.3. Wireless Outlook

The wireless radio network could be a significant backup channel in the event of a wireline network failure. Wireless systems are used by most public safety agencies and are involved in the contingency plans of many industries. The one drawback is that little testing has been done up to this point [CD99].

In addition, there is an important example of an unusual wireless communications failure, worth mentioning here. On January 17, 1994, an earthquake of magnitude 6.7 hit Northridge, California. This event was large enough to cause multiple communications systems to go down, including the phone lines. As a result, many people resorted to using their cellular phones. The ensuing onslaught of cellular traffic was so great that it disrupted emergency radio communications. This example highlights the potential for unforeseen failures arising from the subtle interaction of systems.

7. Emergency Communication Systems

"Often in the context of emergency services when I am asked the question: Well, what might happen if the telecom network doesn't work?

"To me, the answer is very simple. Someone will die. Someone will die because if a 911 call doesn't go through in any aspect of this country within a matter of minutes, certainly lending into hours, there will be people who are in situations who would otherwise have been saved, or sufficiently aided by telecommunication services that won't be. And with that, you can understand the profound and serious nature with which our attention to emergency services needs to be directed" [FCC-E98]

7.1. Emergency Background

Emergency communication systems consist of a myriad of interacting systems through which information, news, help and rescue are conducted. It is imperative these systems are the most robust available, and are always available for emergencies. There are several basic emergency systems around which emergency communications are structured. These systems consist of the Emergency Alert System, 911, conventional 2-way radio, and the emergency alert system.

The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is the system that replaced the EBS (Emergency Broadcast System) and works by monitoring traffic on a public safety radio channel. When there is increased traffic on a local AM safety channel, the system detects the change in traffic then alerts the local television station to the situation. EAS started life as a modification the National Weather Serviceís electronic alerting system, and has developed over time to replace EBS. The main benefit of the new EAS system over EBS, is that broadcasts can now be done regionally, or even sub-regionally. The EAS specification requires every broadcast and cable system in the US monitor at least two other broadcast stations for a sharp increase in traffic. Many of monitoring systems watch the National Weather Service as one of their two stations.

The second of the these three systems is the 911 System. There are two 911 systems currently in place, the traditional Basic 911 system, and the Enhanced 911 (E-911) system. The essence of the 911 system is the routing of every call that come into the local-central office that dial 911 to one common point, most often a police station. The E-911 system has the ability to route selectively through knowledge of where the customer is calling from based on the customerís ANI (automatic number identification), and can be routed specifically to the proper jurisdiction, for fast and efficient service. There are many core components to the 911 system. These components include: PSAP (Public service answering points), CPE (Customer Premises Equipment), ANI (Automatic numbering system), ALI (Automatic Line Information). PSAPs are the actual location that the call is received and processed. There is almost always electronic equipment at the site for recording calls. CPEs are the infrastructure, usually and specialized computer and electronic equipment, used to receive and record calls, and process all other data and emergency aspects of a 911 call. This electronic equipment is often some form of Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD). The ANI is the identification number associated with the incoming call. The CPEs use the ANI to make an ALI (Automatic Line Information) database lookup query to get information about the general location, address, and directions to the 911 callers location. The ALI database will also send back significant facts, if relevant, to the call dispatch. The functionality of this system is highly contingent on the functionality of the telecommunications system. Furthermore, since 911 systems are implemented on a state and regional level, there is no standardization to how the system works specifically. In fact, many 911, and E-911 systems use dedicated telephone lines and tandems for guaranteed routing and traffic avoidance, but once again this is not formally standardized.

Given the complexity and intricate nature of the 911 system, it is worthwhile to examine how these systems actually work. The pre-dispatch phase of a 911 call is a basic sequence of events. First, the PSTN get the 911 call and relays it to the central local office. The 911 call is then send via a 911 Tandem using a computer selected route. The call then reaches the PSAP, and does an ALI lookup. This information is then passed to the operator at the Computer Aided Dispatch terminal who can then speak and help the caller.

When the call comes in, and the operator depresses the answer key, a hidden process begins. This process involves using an ALI controller that requests an ALI lookup over the networked database. This lookup depends on reliable telephone services.

The last of the three core emergency communications is the 2-way radio systems. Conventional 2-way radio is the principle public means for public safety communication. These systems are robust and are not known to have any time or date dependencies. 2-way radio communication is not likely to go down from Y2K effects, so long as there is power [FCC-E98].

7.2. Emergency Issues

Problems in the Emergency System can be simply catastrophic. 911 service is very much like a regular phone call, yet most often it is sent over special dedicated lines (though not necessarily). Therefore, there are likely to be few problems with simply connecting 911 calls. Problems may occur in the passage of date/time information to the particular public safety answering point (PSAP). This is not much of a problem, except for record-keeping and legal reasons [US-1-98]. One 911 system problem may occur at the answering point. PSAPs may need to upgrade their equipment in order to be Y2K compliant. If they are not, they may not be able to generate the ALI inquiry, and thus may not be able to understand and process the messages coming down from the E-911 Tandem.

Unlike the 911 system, the fundamental dependability of the Emergency Alert System is in doubt. This system relies heavily on a chain of communication as the emergency message travels from federal government to state governments to broadcast stations where any point in the chain can interrupt the message [FCC-B99]. Aside from technological problems, one of the major setbacks for public safety agencies is obtaining funding necessary for Y2K compliance. Computer aided dispatch systems are often archaic, and cost millions to replace. It is anticipated that delayed efforts on fixing these systems will come too late. If the ALI controller, embedded in the CAD system was programmed to recognize two digit dates, then the controller will fail come January 1, 2000. The operator in the 911 PSAP will get a voice path, but the ALI will fail and the operator where the call originated from.

Expected costs to repair the 911 system are enormous. It has been estimated that industry wide costs approach billions of dollars. This enormous cost arises from the sheer number of public safely agencies (17000 law enforcement agencies, 75 percent with less than 25 officers) [FCC-W99].

7.3. Network Contingency Planning

Given the importance of emergency communications systems, the FCC and emergency response agencies have taken extreme precaution to ensure 911 and other emergency systems will continue to function. As one precaution a number of carriers have implemented an emergency telecom service that allows national security and emergency response users to use a dedicated area code (710) to receive priority switched voice and data service in the publicly switched network. This service was established by the major carriers and data providers since they are believed to be the robust service in year 2000 [US-1-98]. Another contingency plan is the Government Emergency Telecom Services (GETS). GETS is a special network service that allows emergency services to have priority routing over other network traffic [CD99]. Lastly, the National Telecommunications Coordinating Network is being augmented with non-public network and satellite comm. connectivity among critical NS/EP sites, major service providers, equipment manufacturers. [Fou98]. I

As one last precaution, in case of a complete failure of the wireline networks, high frequency radio connectivity is currently available to AT&T, Sprint, The National Telecommunications Alliance, the FCC, Bell Atlantic, NASA, GTE, Bell south, Ameritech, Southwestern Bell, FEMA, AT&T Wireless, and PacificBell. These sites also provide high frequency message relaying support to government agencies. [Fou98]

7.4. Emergency Outlook

Conventional, 2-way FM radio systems are the principal public safety communication system and are not expected to fail as a direct result of Y2K; however, other supporting systems, such as control systems, electronic security systems (encryption), computer-aided dispatch, recorders, monitors , and so forth, may be at risk because they depend on computers. In addition, public safety agencies depend significantly on the public switched telephone system and the electric power grid [FCC-W99].

The Emergency Alert System relies on television and radio broadcasts. Contingency planning often depends on having a person at the radio station. This is the case because of detection imperfections in the technology had often led to broadcasts of irrelevant data. Many radio stations have thus turned off the automated system to leave their operators listen to the alerts manually before broadcasting them on the air.

8. Summary

When considering the Year 2000 Technology Problem, it is best to take a holistic view. The most insidious problems are not going to be simple software bugs, but rather, intricate system failures. The interconnectivity and interdependency of most of today's industries means that small, indirect failures can propagate from system to system, leading to unforeseen catastrophe. The Communications Industry is a prime example of an industry that is vulnerable to such indirect failures.

For the most part, the communications infrastructure is rather robust. The communications network has been designed for unfailing reliability, not exclusive of the Year 2000 Problem. Practically none of the communications hardware or embedded systems contain date or time dependencies, so the network is relatively immune to direct Y2K failures. Of greater concern are peripheral systems and external dependencies.

All sectors of the industry have some peripheral systems that are controlled by software and are date/time dependent. Most of these systems are not likely to cause major failures, but rather will be inconvenient nuisances. At the same time, there do exist peripheral systems with the potential to cause extensive network failures. History has demonstrated that relatively minor errors can cause wide-spread loss of communications. The industry is dedicating extensive resources to determining what systems could cause such errors and how they can best be handled.

Overall, the industry is doing an excellent job of sharing information and testing, and seems well prepared for the coming millenium. Most potential problems have been discovered and are currently being dealt with. Furthermore, the industry has a well-earned reputation for reliability, upheld through industry-wide cooperation and careful contingency planning. There is every reason to believe that the Communications Industry will continue to provide reliable service before, during and after the Year 2000 event.

9. References

[Bea98] Beach, Gary. Prepared Statement of Gary Beach, Publisher, CIO Magazine, before the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. Washington: Federal Information Systems Corporation, 1998.

[Bin98] Bingaman, Jeff. Prepared Statement of Senator Jeff Bingaman before the Special Senate Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. Washington: Federal Information Systems Corp., 1998.

[CD99] "Year 2000 Tests Near End Without Finding Major Glitches," Communications Daily, 9 February 1999.

[DY99] "New Year's Glitches Highlight Y2K-Bug Threat," The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 28 January 1999.

[Edw98] Edwards, Dr. John S. Prepared Testimony of Dr. John S. Edwards on the Presidentís National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee before the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. Washington: Federal Information Systems Corporation, 1998.

[FCC-B99] Federal Communications Commission. FCC Y2K Activities: Broadcasting. Available at http://www.fcc.gov/year2000/broadcasting.html (20 February 1999).

[FCC-C99] Federal Communications Commission. FCC Y2K Activities: Cable. Available at http://www.fcc.gov/year2000/cable.html (20 February 1999).

[FCC-E98] Federal Communications Commission. Year 2000: Maintaining Emergency Response Communications November 16, 1998. Available at http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/archive/tr111698.txt (21 February 1999).

[FCC-W99] Federal Communications Commission. FCC Y2K Activities: Wireless. Available at http://www.fcc.gov/year2000/wireless.html (20 February 1999).

[Fou98] Fountaine, D. Diane. Prepared Statement of Ms. D. Diane Fountaine, Deputy Manager, National Communications System, before the Senate Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. Washington: Federal Information Systems Corporation, 1998.

[KCS99] " 'Foreign Nations Lag in Y2K Preparations, ëMany have taken no steps so far,' World Bank Says," The Kansas City Star, 6 February 1999.

[Ken98] Kennard, William E. Statement of William E. Kennard, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. Washington: Federal Information Systems Corporation, 1998.

[Kow98] Kowitz, Fred. Statement of Fred Kowitz, Director of Ameritech Corporation, before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology of the Committee on government Reform and Oversight. Washington: Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., 1998.

[LAT99] "Ventura County News; Call Boxes Latest Target of Y2K Bug," Los Angeles Times, 11 February 1999.

[Lis98] List, Dr. Judith. Prepared Testimony of Dr. Judith List, Vice President and General Manager of Integrated Technology Solutions in the Business Unit of Bellcore, before the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. Washington: Federal Information Systems Corp., 1998.

[LMRN99] "Paging, SMR Carriers heading toward Y2K Compliance Despite Financial Burden," Land Mobile Radio News, 5 February 1999.

[NST99] "Threats from Y2K-embedded systems, " New Straits Times (Malaysia), 8 February 1999.

[Pow98] Powell, Michael K. Prepared Statement of Michael K. Powell, Commissioner of the Federal Communications Commission, before the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. Washington: Federal Information Systems Corporation, 1998.

[PR99] "Year 2000 Readiness Disclosure Avista Corp. Completes Y2K Testing of All Electric Generation and Transmission Facilities; 11 Diversified Generators and 172 Substations Now Y2K Ready," PR Newswire (Spokane, WA), 16 February 1999.

[RCR99] "Telecom Industry's Y2K Challenge Among the Biggest," Radio Communications Report, 1 February 1999.

[Rot-1-98] Roth, A. Gerard. Prepared Statement of A. Gerard Roth, Vice President of Technology Programs, GTE, before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means on the Year 2000 Computer Problem and Telecommunication Systems. Washington: Federal Information Systems Corporation, 1998.

[Rot-2-98] Roth, A. Gerard. Prepared Statement of A. Gerard Roth, Vice President of Technology Programs at GTE, on behalf of the Telco Year 2000 Forum, before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services. Washington: Federal Information Systems Corp., 1998.

[TS99] "A Y2K Checklist for Teleworkers Home Offices Not Immune," The Toronto Sun, 20 January 1999.

[US-1-98] United States Congress, Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. Preparedness of the Nation'sTelecommunications Industry. Washington: Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., 1998.

[US-2-98] United States Congress, Oversight Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee. Year 2000 Computer Problems. Washington: Federal Information Systems Corp., 1998.

[Whi98] White, William O. Statement of William O. White, Member of the Telco Year 2000 Forum, before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means on the Year 2000 Problem and Telecommunications Systems. Washington: Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., 1998.

[WTN99] "Powell Berates Wireless Industry for Poor Y2K Response," Washington Telecom Newswire, 10 February 1999.

[Yar-34-99] Yardeni, Dr. Edward. The Y2K Reporter #34, 25 January 1999. Available at http://www.yardeni.com as of 19 February 1999.

[Yar-36-99] Yardeni, Dr. Edward. The Y2K Reporter #36, 22 February 1999. Available at http://www.yardeni.com as of 19 February 1999.