BIB-VERSION:: CS-TR-v2.0
ID:: ncstrl.dartmouthcs//TR2003-441
ENTRY:: February 15, 2008
ORGANIZATION:: Dartmouth College, Computer Science
TITLE:: Flexible and Scalable Public Key Security for SSH
TYPE:: Technical Report (paper)
REVISION:: 1
AUTHOR:: Ali, Yasir
AUTHOR:: Smith, S. W.
DATE:: February 2003
RETRIEVAL:: For a paper copy, email <reports@cs.dartmouth.edu>
RETRIEVAL:: For a paper copy, write to
       Technical Report Librarian
       Department of Computer Science
       Dartmouth College
       6211 Sudikoff Laboratory
       Hanover, NH 03755-3510
       USA
RETRIEVAL:: PDF at http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2003-441.pdf
ABSTRACT:: 
A standard tool for secure remote access, the SSH protocol uses public-key cryptography to establish an encrypted and integrity-protected channel with a remote server. However, widely-deployed implementations of the protocol are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, where an adversary substitutes her public key for the server's. This danger particularly threatens a traveling user Bob borrowing a client machine.
   Imposing a traditional X.509 PKI on all SSH servers and clients is neither flexible nor scalable nor (in the foreseeable future) practical. Requiring extensive work or an SSL server at Bob's site is also not practical for many users.
   This paper presents our experiences designing and implementing an alternative scheme that solves the public-key security problem in SSH without requiring such an a priori universal trust structure or extensive sysadmin work--although it does require a modified SSH client. (The code is available for public download.)
NOTE:: 
A revised version, published as a conference paper, as follows:
<br>Y. Ali, S.W. Smith.
<br>"Flexible and Scalable Public Key Security for SSH."
<br>Public Key Infrastructure: EuroPKI 2004, pp. 43-56,
<br>LNCS 3093, June 2004. Springer-Verlag. DOI 10.1007/b98201.
<br>http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/b98201
<br>http://www.springerlink.com/content/h8jng6kc1rf3j97g/
END:: ncstrl.dartmouthcs//TR2003-441