@TechReport{Dartmouth:TR2003-443,
  author = {John C. Marchesini and Sean W. Smith and Meiyuan Zhao},
  title = {{Keyjacking: Risks of the Current Client-side Infrastructure}},
  institution = {Dartmouth College, Computer Science},
  address = {Hanover, NH},
  number = {TR2003-443},
  year = {2003},
  month = {February},
  URL = {http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2003-443.ps.Z},
  abstract = {
    In theory, PKI can provide a flexible and strong way to
    authenticate users in distributed information systems. In practice,
    much is being invested in realizing this vision via client-side SSL
    and browser-based keystores. Exploring this vision, we demonstrate
    that browsers will use personal certificates to authenticate requests
    that the person neither knew of nor approved (and which password-based
    systems would have defeated), and we demonstrate the easy permeability
    of these keystores (including new attacks on medium and high-security
    IE/XP keys). We suggest some countermeasures, but also suggest that a
    fundamental rethinking of the trust, usage, and storage model might
    result in a more effective PKI.
  }
}