@TechReport{Dartmouth:TR2003-476,
  author = {John Marchesini and Sean W. Smith and Omen Wild and Rich MacDonald},
  title = {{Experimenting with TCPA/TCG Hardware, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love The Bear}},
  institution = {Dartmouth College, Computer Science},
  address = {Hanover, NH},
  number = {TR2003-476},
  year = {2003},
  month = {December},
  URL = {http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2003-476.pdf},
  comment = {
    This report, TR2003-476, supersedes TR2003-471 of August 2003.
    Furthermore, the December 15, 2003 version of TR2003476 fixes
    typos found in the December 4, 2003 version.
  },
  abstract = {
    Over the last few years, our group has been working on applications of
    secure coprocessors---but has been frustrated by the limited
    computational environment and high expense of such devices.  Over the
    last few years, the TCPA (now TCG) has produced a specification for a
    trusted platform module (TPM)---a small hardware addition
    intended to improve the overall security of a larger machine (and tied
    up with a still-murky vision of Windows-based trusted computing). 
    Some commodity desktops now come up with these TPMs.
       Consequently, we began an experiment to see if (in the absence of a
    Non-Disclosure Agreement) we could use this hardware to transform a
    desktop Linux machine into a virtual secure coprocessor: more powerful
    but less secure than higher-end devices.  This experiment has several
    purposes: to provide a new platform for secure coprocessor
    applications, to see how well the TCPA/TCG approach works, and (by
    working in open source) to provide a platform for the broader
    community to experiment with alternative architectures in the
    contentious area of trusted computing.
       This paper reports what we have learned so far: the approach is
    feasible, but effective deployment requires a more thorough look at OS
    security.
  }
}