Dartmouth College Computer Science Technical Report series	CS home TR home TR search TR listserv
By author:	A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
By number:	2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, 1996, 1995, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988, 1987, 1986

Abstract:

A secure system that cannot be used by real users to secure real-world processes is not really secure at all. While many believe that usability and security are diametrically opposed, a growing body of research from the field of Human-Computer Interaction and Security (HCISEC) refutes this assumption. All researchers in this field agree that focusing on aligning usability and security goals can enable the design of systems that will be more secure under actual usage.

We bring to bear tools from the social sciences (economics, sociology, psychology, etc.) not only to help us better understand why deployed systems fail, but also to enable us to accurately characterize the problems that we must solve in order to build systems that will be secure in the real world. Trust, a critically important facet of any socio-technical secure system, is ripe for analysis using the tools provided for us by the social sciences.

There are a variety of scopes in which issues of trust in secure systems can be stud- ied. We have chosen to focus on how humans decide to trust new correspondents. Current secure email systemsÑsuch as S/MIME and PGP/MIMEÑare not expressive enough to capture the real ways that trust flows in these sorts of scenarios. To solve this problem, we begin by applying concepts from social science research to a variety of such cases from interesting application domains; primarily, crisis management in the North American power grid. We have examined transcripts of telephone calls made between grid manage- ment personnel during the August 2003 North American blackout and extracted several different classes of trust flows from these real-world scenarios. Combining this knowl- edge with some design patterns from HCISEC, we develop criteria for a system that will enable humans apply these same methods of trust-building in the digital world. We then present Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email (ABUSE) and not only show that it meets our criteria, but also provide empirical evidence that real users are helped by the system.

Note: Ph.D Dissertation. Advisor: Sean W. Smith.

Bibliographic citation for this report: [plain text] [BIB] [BibTeX] [Refer]

Or copy and paste:
   Christopher P. Masone, "Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email." Dartmouth Computer Science Technical Report TR2008-633, August 2008.

Notify me about new tech reports.

Search the technical reports.

To receive paper copy of a report, by mail, send your address and the TR number to reports AT cs.dartmouth.edu

Copyright notice: The documents contained in this server are included by the contributing authors as a means to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work on a non-commercial basis. Copyright and all rights therein are maintained by the authors or by other copyright holders, notwithstanding that they have offered their works here electronically. It is understood that all persons copying this information will adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. These works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder.

Technical reports collection maintained by David Kotz.