Utility Driven Mobile-Agent Scheduling Dartmouth Technical Report PCS-TR98-331 Jonathan Bredin David Kotz Daniela Rus Date: October 1998 URL (compressed postscript): (136KB) URL (PDF): (240KB) Abstract: We investigate the possibility of using markets to regulate mobile agents, computer programs that are capable of migrating from one machine to another. Market participation requires quantitative information about resource consumption to define demand and calculate utility. We create a formal utility model to derive user-demand functions, allowing agents to efficiently plan expenditure and deal with price fluctuations. By quantifying demand and utility, resource owners can precisely set a value for a good. We simulate our model in a mobile agent scheduling environment and show how prices fluctuate, compounding uncertainty in an agent's plans. To solve this problem, we propose that resource owners sell options to allow agents to trade away their risk. Note: Original version in May 1998; revised October 3, 1998. See related papers.