A Game-Theoretic Formulation of Multi-Agent Resource Allocation

Dartmouth Technical Report PCS-TR99-360

	Jonathan Bredin
	Rajiv T. Maheswaran
	Cagri Imer
	Tamer Basar
	David Kotz
	Daniela Rus

Date: October 1999

URL (compressed postscript): <http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR99-360.ps.Z> (272KB)

URL (PDF): <http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR99-360.pdf> (236KB)

Abstract:
 This paper considers resource allocation in a network with
 mobile agents competing for computational priority.  We formulate this
 problem as a multi-agent game with the players being agents purchasing
 service from a common server.  We show that there exists a computable
 Nash equilibrium when agents have perfect information into the future.
 We simulate a network of hosts and agents using our strategy to show that
 our resource-allocation mechanism effectively prioritizes agents according
 to their endowments.

Note:
 Submitted to "Autonomous Agents 2000".
 See <a href="http://agent.cs.dartmouth.edu/papers/#market">related papers.</a>