A Context-Aware Kernel IPC Firewall for Android

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ABSTRACT
Our phones go wherever we go. Ever present, and with ever more data and connections, smartphones hold as much sensitive data as traditional systems but do not have the same protections. Android’s recent 6.0 (Marshmallow) release introduced much needed dynamic permission checks for applications. However, this does not go far enough in adapting to mobile phone’s unique security needs. Smartphones encounter a wide variety of settings and situations that current security solutions fail to account for. We introduce a context-aware IPC firewall for Android that dynamically filters messages based on environmental data. Our BinderFilter can both block and modify Android IPC messages sent through Binder, which is in a position of complete mediation in Android. Our Binder hooking framework and message parser are unique in their scope and implementation—and mitigate broad classes of cross-app attacks, such as “collusion” and “UI-based activity hijacking” attacks. We also provide a policy application, Picky, with which users can set policy rules for any message and target applications. BinderFilter and Picky are free software, available at [1, 2].

1. INTRODUCTION
Android is the world’s most popular mobile operating system with over 1.4 billion users [3]. The wide variety of sensor and personal data that phones store make them rich targets for attackers and data miners masquerading as third-party applications. Recently, various health tracking applications were found to export medical information to third-party servers [4], and Facebook’s Messenger application has faced criticism for requiring extraneous permissions [5].

Android’s security architecture is based on permissions [14]. Applications request permissions to access various system APIs such as Camera, Location, Microphone, and user data such as Contacts, Calendar, and External Storage. In October 2015, Google released version 6.0 of Android, named Marshmallow, which included major security updates such as dynamic permission checking for certain dangerous permissions [6]. Prior to Marshmallow, applications would statically request permissions at install time, and users would have no way of revoking or changing application permissions. Dynamic permission checking in Android Marshmallow filled a significant need in Android security policy. However, it is not sufficiently granular, nor does it expose all permission decisions to users. Furthermore, as Marshmallow has been adapted by only 7.5% of users as of May 2016 [7], additional security architectures are needed to ensure user privacy for all.

Android phones suffer from malware somewhat disproportionately. At the core of the problem is the fact that malware can commandeer other apps to do its dirty work, abusing the technology that Android provides for legitimate communications between apps. Since interaction between apps is desirable and part of the normal functionality, it is not easy to close that malware attack vector, despite some new security improvements recently released.

In a sense, Android’s app microcosm problem is the same as the Internet macrocosm’s: we want computers and apps to talk to each other; we just want to be able to control who’s talking to whom. Just like the Internet has developed the mitigation of the firewall to block undesirable communications, so the Android platform has been developing a means for blocking selected bad inter-app communications.

Just as firewalls evolved, the depth of examination of individual messages increased, and concepts of state were added, similar evolution is taking place on the Android platform. Our design, presented in this paper, aims to provide both the deepest level of message examination and the richest context for policy decisions.

While most security add-ons for Android see the need for some type of dynamic, fine-grained blocking, only a handful such as [29, 30] have focused on the mobile nature of mobile phones. Our approach focuses on the current specific needs of Android security by designing and implementing the following.

- A novel context-aware security system for Android that includes sensor, network, and system state data into policy decisions.
- A message hooking framework for Android’s Binder IPC system that provides the necessary feature of complete mediation of Android IPC messages, including intents and permissions.
- Blocking and modifying message data, including more...
dynamic permissions than Android Marshmallow exposes to users.

- A Binder message parser and formatter, allowing for dynamic analysis of every Android IPC message.
- A user application that abstracts security policy and allows dynamic message blocking of any message and application.

Table 1 shows how our project improves on existing Android security add-ons. We survey the related work in section 6. Briefly, other hooking frameworks for Android such as Heuser et al.’s Android Security Modules [11] and rovo89’s Xposed Framework [12] have not demonstrated complete mediation of all IPC messages. Ours is the first of its kind that hooks Binder. Nitat Artenstein and Idan Revivo demonstrated Binder message parsing and data exfiltration but did not go as far as systematically hooking and modifying message data [13].

The remainder of this paper is as follows. We first review the background on Android’s Binder IPC in section 2, then discuss our IPC firewall design considerations and implementation in section 3. Section 4 gives a brief overview of our UI application for configuring the firewall. Section 5 evaluates the mitigations our firewall provides against broad classes of attacks and malware abuses of the Android platform, and section 6 surveys previous work.

2. BACKGROUND

The Android platform is a set of libraries, compilation tools, interpreters, and kernel drivers built on Linux. It inherits Linux’s file permissions, system call architecture, and, in Android versions after 4.3, SELinux policies. Android application permissions correspond to capabilities and are enforced by the PackageManager service via checkPermission. System permissions (such as installing packages or rebooting) are only available to system services and applications such as Settings and Google Play Store located in /system/app or /system/priv-app, which are read-only enforced by Linux. Network sockets and writes to external storage are also enforced by the kernel via Linux group ID’s (GIDs). Each application is given a unique Linux user ID (UID) on installation. Android then enforces application memory sandboxing by running each application as its own process under its unique UID. File access is restricted by the underlying filesystem and SELinux policy, whereas service and RPC function calls are restricted by Android’s PackageManager based on UID.

2.1 Binder

Communication between sandboxed applications is done via Binder inter-process communication (IPC). Binder replaces Linux’s own IPC system in Android and enables uniquely identifying security tokens, death notifications, and (intra-package) RPC. Intents, Messengers, and ContentProviders are all built on Binder. (Intents in Android are asynchronous messages passed between applications to request data or to start a new activity.)

2.1.1 Binder Driver

Binder is implemented as a Linux kernel driver (/dev/binder), which is exposed to userland processes using the ioctl() syscall. The Binder driver is also responsible for copying data between sandboxed user processes, including data buffers, file descriptors, and death notifications.

The Binder driver ioctl() call takes as a parameter binder_write_read, which contains information about driver buffer consumption and pointers to marshaled user transaction data. The write_buffer and read_buffer fields point to binder_transaction_data objects. Those contain sender pid, receiver pid, uid information, and pointers to data buffers and offsets. Specifically, the data.ptr.offsets field points to flat_binder_object objects. Finally, flat_binder_object contains extra information such as file descriptors. These structures are listed below.

```
struct binder_write_read {
    signed long  write_size;
    signed long  write_consumed;
    unsigned long write_buffer;
    signed long  read_size;
    signed long  read_consumed;
    unsigned long read_buffer;
};

struct binder_transaction_data {
    union {
        size_t handle;
        void *ptr;
    } target;
    void *cookie;
    unsigned int code;
    unsigned int flags;
    pid_t sender_pid;
    uid_t sender_euid;
    size_t data_size;
    size_t offsets_size;
    union {
        struct {
            void *buffer;
            void *offsets;
        } ptr;
        uint8_t buf[8];
    } data;
};

struct flat_binder_object {
    unsigned long type;
    unsigned long flags;
    union {
        void *binder;
        size_t handle;
    };
    void *cookie;
};
```

Figure 1 shows a simplified Binder IPC transaction between two processes. Figure 2 illustrates the complete path from a userland Java application to the Binder driver. Figure 3 shows a simplified process of registering and calling an Android system service. Each service registers with the Context Manager process (ServiceManager service), which is a special Binder node with ID 0. ServiceManager is started from init. Android system services register with ServiceManager, and clients make requests with the ServiceManager proxy to query for system services.

`binder_ioctl()` is the entry point from userland into the kernel driver, upon which user buffers are written, read, or both. Pseudocode in Listing 1 illustrates the driver code’s sequence of actions for a client making a service request. Note that data in steps 4c, 4d, 5b, and 5c represents a...
Table 1: BinderFilter and other Android privacy enhancement projects.

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client’s data being transferred to the requested service. Figure 4 illustrates this data transfer facilitated by the driver.

1. device_initcall(binder_init); // called when kernel boots
2. binder_init()
   a. misc_register(&binder_miscdev) // register driver name and file operations
3. binder_ioctl() // entry point from userland
   a. wait_event_interruptible() // block caller until a response
   b. copy_from_user() // copy struct
   c. binder_write_read from userland
4. binder_thread_write() // Called by client making a request
   a. switch(cmd) {... // checks user command
   b. binder_transaction()
   c. copy_from_user(data) // copy data from userland
   * filter_binder(data) // our hook
   d. list_add_tail(data, target) // add work to the target thread’s queue
   e. wake_up_interruptible(target) // wake up the sleeping service thread
5. binder_thread_read() // Called by service thread waiting to handle requests
   a. while (1) { if (BINDER_LOOPER_NEED_DATA) goto retry; }
   b. data = list_first_entry() // get request data
   c. copy_to_user(data) // copy the data to service

Listing 1: Binder driver code analysis. ‘data’ labeled in red represents a Binder user parcel, which is moved by the Binder driver between separate process address spaces.

3. BINDERFILTER

BinderFilter is our hooking implementation of Binder. Compiled as a static kernel driver, our filter steals Binder messages and modifies them based on our IPC firewall policy. Being in the Binder allows us to have complete access to all IPC messages and gather context information directly from sensor hardware.

3.1 Design

3.1.1 Complete Mediation

We choose to block Android permissions and “steal” IPC messages in the Binder, rather than upstream of it (as done by many of our predecessors), because this architectural choice allows us to have a good level of granularity while being able to capture all messages. Because direct Binder messages (app to app, app to service) are possible, the ServiceManager is not in a position of complete mediation: apps can register Binder receivers that don’t go through ServiceManager via Service.bindService() [16].
Permissions encapsulate IPC firewall policy at the level of granularity we require. For example, multiple ways to get phone location mean multiple intents to block [17]. We can block all of them with one permission! For camera messages, applications like VSCO and GoogleCamera implement their own camera wrapper, which calls Android’s Camera API [18]. In this case, multiple types of intents can be encapsulated in one permission, android.permission.CAMERA.

### 3.1.2 Hook placement

We hook binder.c in one location (http://androidxref.com/kernel/3.18/xref/drivers/staging/android/binder.c#1520). At this point in a Binder call, the driver has just validated user buffer data and copied it into kernel address space, but has yet to act on it. Here we steal the buffer and modify it in the kernel if needed (Figure 5). Our hook function declaration is exported with EXPORT_SYMBOL.

```c
#include "binder_filter.h"
extern int filter_binder_message(unsigned long, signed long, int, int, void*, size_t);
...
static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, struct binder_thread *thread, struct binder_transaction_data *tr, int reply) {
  struct binder_transaction *t = kzalloc(sizeof
```

Figure 5: Binder driver hook placement

### 3.1.3 Grammar

We define a policy grammar for firewall rules as in Figure 6. Messages are passed in as string literals to enable support for dynamic blocking of all messages.

```plaintext
message:uid|action_code|context{context_type:context_val}()|data();
string int32 int32 int32 (int32 int32/string|string);
android.permission.BODY_SENSORS:10008:1:0;
youtube:10061:1:0;
android.permission.CAMERA:10078:1:2:2:2:Live:Public:
android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO:10081:3:4:1:2:2:Live:Google:
```

Figure 6: BinderFilter policy grammar example. Matching fields have the same color.

### 3.2 Logging

The Android Binder driver (binder.c) uses three types of logging frameworks: printk, TRACE_EVENT, and seq_printf. We develop a log message formatter for existing Binder kernel debug message logs using Python. The code can be found at [21]. An example of the existing log message compared to its formatted version can be found in Figure 7.
Binder’s existing log output does not include buffer contents. We parse flattened Binder message buffers in Binder-Filter for dynamic IPC analysis (see Figure 8). Contents are printed to the kernel debug buffer when BinderFilter’s `filter_print_buffer_contents` module parameter is set.

```
static void apply_filter(char * user_buf, size_t data_size, int euid) {
    char * ascii_buffer =
        get_string_matching_buffer(user_buf, data_size);
    struct bf_filter_rule* rule = all_filters. filters_list_head;
    ...
    if (binder_filter_block_messages == 1) {
        while (rule != NULL) {
            if (rule->uid == euid && context_matches(rule)) {
                block_or_modify_messages(user_buf, data_size, ascii_buffer, rule->message);
            }
            rule = rule->next;
        }
    }
    kfree(ascii_buffer);
}
```

3.3 Blocking

In this section we analyze Binder IPC message content examples much like network packets, for implementation of features specified in the introduction. Our blocking implementation looks at Binder message string literals and wipes buffer contents if the message and context match our firewall policy.

```
static void block_or_modify_messages(char* user_buf, size_t data_size, char* ascii_buffer, const char* message) {
    char* message_location = strstr(ascii_buffer, message);
    if (message_location != NULL) {
        memset(user_buf, 0, data_size);
    }
}
```

Listing 3: BinderFilter blocking logic. UID, Context, and blocking are highlighted.

3.3.1 Permissions

We have currently implemented and tested blocking of the following permissions:

- android.permission.CAMERA
- android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
- android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
- android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS
- android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS
- android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
- android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
- android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
- android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
- android.permission.INTERNET
- android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
- android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
- android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
- android.permission.CALL_PHONE
- android.permission.READ_CALL_LOG
- android.permission.WRITE_CALL_LOG
- android.permission.SEND_SMS
- android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
- android.permission.READ_SMS
- android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS
- android.permission.RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH
- android.permission.READ_CALENDAR
- android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR
- android.permission.BODY_SENSORS
- android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
- android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
- android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
- android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
- android.permission.BATTERY_STATS
- android.permission.BLUETOOTH
- android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN
- android.permission.NFC
- android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN
- android.permission.FLASHLIGHT
- android.permission.TRANSMIT_IR
- android.permission.USE_SIP

The Binder message that is sent as a result of PackageManager’s `checkPermission()` call contains the UID of the application in question and the string literal of the Android permission.

```
((0) (64) (24) (0)android.on.IPowerManager(0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0))
```

3.3.2 System Permissions

Android’s PackageManager service checks system applications’ permissions differently (see Section 2). Below is a code excerpt from the service that assigns system run-time install permissions to system apps.

```
// Only system components can circumvent runtime permissions when installing.
if ((installFlags & PackageManager.
    INSTALL_GRANT_RUNTIME_PERMISSIONS) != 0
    && mContext.checkCallingOrSelfPermission(
        Manifest.permission.
        ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION(0) (155) (9) (0)) )
```

```
Listing 4: BinderFilter blocking logic. UID, Context, and blocking are highlighted.

```
```
To properly block system permissions, we must look at the specific apps that use them. An analysis of Google Play Store finds that before installation of packages, the com.android.vending.INTENT_PACKAGE_INSTALL_COMMIT intent is sent. Here we can block that intent in lieu of the permission.

Figure 9: Message analysis for installation activity

3.4 Context

Context is obtained directly from sensor data in the BinderFilter driver. This defends against spoofed data. In the event that context information cannot be obtained, default fallback policy rules are followed. Figure 10 shows parsing with SSID from its flattened Binder buffer.

Figure 10: Message analysis for Wi-Fi SSID

3.5 Message Modification

By modification of Binder messages we mean replacing message content with other content before the (modified) message reaches its target. For example, a user may want to send fake image or audio recording data to an application instead of blocking requests and risking a crash, should the application fail to deal gracefully with the failure.

This capability powerfully complements blocking of messages and has been implemented by the best-of-breed host-based network firewalls such as Netfilter, which includes the IPQUEUE and newer NFQUEUE mechanisms to just this effect. These mechanisms also enable low-level security research, as we hope ours will as well.

We implement copying file contents with `sys_read` and `sys_write`.

```
static void copy_file_to_file(char* filename_src, char* filename_dst)
{
    ... 
    vfs_write(write_file, read_buf, read_len, &pos);
    fput(write_file);
    ... 
}
```

Listing 5: Code snippet of buffered file copying in the kernel

3.6 Deployment

Android versions 4.3 and above disable loadable kernel modules by default. To hook Binder, which is a statically compiled kernel driver, we must recompile the kernel with our hooking code in it. We can then flash the new kernel image onto an Android device. This step preserves user information, apps, and state, and requires an unlocked bootloader and root access.

4. PICKY

Picky implements a user interface for setting BinderFilter policy. It allows users to dynamically set policy in an accessible and usable way. Supported features include:

- Requiring a lockscreen to open
- Import and Export policy file
- Persistent policy across application sessions and reboot
- Per-application blocking of messages
- User-defined custom messages
- Contextual policy rules
- Modification of messages
4.1 Kernel Interface

Android’s NDK (Native Development Kit) allows Java apps to call Native C++ code through the JNI (Java Native Interface) framework [20]. Java functions with the `native` keyword are implemented in the JNI layer. We use this layer to call `sys_open`, `sys_read`, and `sys_write` to read and write userland policy to and from the BinderFilter kernel driver. File and SELinux permissions are dynamically set for BinderFilter drivers to allow access.

**Picky.java:**
```java
public static native String nativeReadPolicy();
public static native String
    nativeWriteFilterLine(int action, int uid,
        String message, String data);
```

**picky-jni.c:**
```c
JNIEXPORT jstring JNICALL
Java_Picky_Policy_nativeReadPolicy (JNIEnv *
        env, jclass type ) {
    char returnValue [4096] ...  
    int fd = open("/dev/binderfilter", O_RDWR);  
    int len = read(fd, returnValue, sizeRead);  
    return (* env ) -> NewStringUTF (env,  
        return_value);
}
```

**Java_Picky_Policy_nativeWriteFilterLine(JNIEnv * env, jclass type, jint action, jint uid, jstring message, jstring data) {**
```c
struct bf_user_filter user_filter;
user_filter.action = (int) action;
user_filter.uid = (int) uid;
user_filter.message = (char *) message;
user_filter.data = (char *) data;
user_filter.context = 0;
int fd = open("/dev/binderfilter", O_RDWR);
int write_len = write(fd, &user_filter, sizeof(user_filter));
...  
return (* env ) -> NewStringUTF (env, 
        write_len_str);
```

**binder_filter.c:**
```c
static ssize_t bf_write (struct file *file,  
    const char __user *buf, size_t len,  
    loff_t *ppos) {
    struct bf_user_filter* user_filter =  
        init_bf_user_filter();  
    ...  
    if (copy_from_user(user_filter, buf, sizeof  
        (struct bf_user_filter))) {
        return 0;
    }
    ...  
    add_or_remove_filter(user_filter);  
    write_persistent_policy();  
    ...  
}
```

```c
static ssize_t bf_read (struct file * file,  
    char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) {
    int len;
    char* ret_str = get_policy_string();
```
len = strlen(ret_str);
...
if (copy_to_user(buf, ret_str, len)) {
    return -EINVAL;
}
return len;
}

Listing 6: Android JNI layer kernel interaction (highlighted).

5. EVALUATION

Here we discuss the effectiveness of our firewall against various classes of attacks previously discussed in both academic and industry literature.

Information stealing and overzealous applications. We tested our firewall with various applications from the Play Store such as Facebook, Evernote, Keep, Maps, etc., as well as an application we developed as a sanity check on individual permissions. We note that the adoption of Android 6.0 dynamic permission checking by application developers has not been widespread, and, whereas some apps like Facebook and Evernote will restart gracefully on a permission denial, other applications will stop due to a lack of dynamic permission checking. Both stock applications and malicious applications such as Android.Enesoluty [31] and Android.Loozfon [32] are subjected to our message filter.

Malicious apps with root privileges such as mempodroid [33]. Root applications are contained by Linux processes with the root or system UID. Because we intercept all messages for all UIDs, apps started with the system UID are blocked by our firewall regardless of root privileges. We note that if malicious applications are able to overwrite underlying SELinux policies, they could disable our firewall; however, preventing such privilege escalation in the filesystem is out of the scope of this project.

Collusion attacks such as [34, 35]. We can block applications that combine their separate permissions in order to achieve functionality beyond what a user intends. We detect an application’s process state as started or stopped based on android.intent.category.LAUNCHER and android.intent.action_PACKAGE_RESTARTED intents. This application running context can then inform policy to prevent colluding applications.

UI-based attacks. These attacks trick users into providing input into a window controlled by the attacker, either by overlaying malicious elements on top of trusted applications [36, 37, 38, 39], or by preempting trusted applications with a phishing window [36, 38, 40, 41, 42]. Android 6.0 requires users to explicitly allow overlay permissions in response to many abuses of the overlay architecture. For previous versions of Android, our IPC firewall blocks overlay access with the android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission.

We can prevent activity hijacking attacks that preempt trusted application screens with an identical phishing screen. Our firewall blocks WindowManager requests for an application during that application’s window session. This is analogous to the Overlay Mutex in [36], which only allows one application to control the display window at once. We define a window session start as an application intent to IWindowSession, which contains the package name for the starting application. The window session end is defined as a user touch input event for either the back, home, or menu button. These events are captured in the Binder from android.hardware.input.IInputManager.

6. RELATED WORK

Research around Android security systems has have focused on data privacy in terms of permission revocation [8, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29], taint analysis [9, 23], and sandboxing [10, 24, 25]. Taint analysis was first introduced in Enck et al.’s influential TaintDroid, which monitors user data by tagging (tainting) it dynamically in Android’s Dalvik VM [9]. LeakMiner [23] uses static taint analysis for applications on the Play Store to detect possible information leakage. Permission revocation has been used to prevent information leakage via an inline reference monitor in Backes et al. [8]. Aurasium achieves fine-grained, dynamic permission checking by repackaging application packages with sandboxing code, which is then enforced by hooks in the Dalvik VM [24]. Backes et al. (2015) deviates from UID-permission based security architectures with an application sandboxing architecture based on app virtualization [10]. FlaskDroid [25] enforces fine-grained, dynamic permission revocation in the kernel by dynamically setting SELinux policies for userland applications based on a trusted user space agent. We take their approach of a trusted userland policy application enforced by the kernel.

Although our Binder IPC hooking approach requires modification to underlying kernel code, it makes no assumptions about Android layers that are more likely to change over time, such as the Dalvik VM. Specifically, security add-ons that rely on Dalvik hooks may be broken in by Android’s successor to Dalvik, ART, which introduced ahead-of-time compilation in Android 5.0.

Previous architectures that have hooked Binder have shown promising results: we build on projects like DeepDroid [29] to systematically intercept and modify all Binder messages without relying on Dalvik VM or Android middleware code injection. Nitay Artenstein and Idan Revivo demonstrated Binder message parsing and data exfiltration but did not go as far as systematically hooking and modifying message data [13].

We adopt DeepDroid and CRePE’s automatic context detection for policy enforcement [29, 30] and apply it to the new Android security landscape of SELinux, ART, and dynamic permission revocation in Marshmallow. Security policy must be informed by the environment that a system encounters. To summarize, our main contributions to this previous work include a context-aware policy system that bases filtering decisions on the system’s state, and a hooking framework in Android’s IPC system that supports blocking, stealing, and modification of all IPC messages.

7. CONCLUSIONS

We have introduced a new hooking framework for Binder. Our use of Binder driver hooks in BinderFilter and Picky allows users to control their privacy settings per application, context, and message. In addition, users can specify custom messages to block and modify saved content data. More work remains to be done in adding contexts and message modifications. Because dynamic permission checking was only recently introduced in Android 6.0, many apps still do
not handle permission revocation, leading to crashes. Modification of message content (as opposed to simply blocking messages) could prevent unwanted crashes of applications while also ensuring user data privacy.

8. REFERENCES


Figure 14: Binder driver code analysis timeline. Visualization of Listing 1.

Figure 15: Binder code path (application layer). Expansion of Figure 2.
Figure 16: Binder code path (application framework layer). Expansion of Figure 2.

Figure 17: Binder code path (core libraries layer). Expansion of Figure 2.
Figure 18: Binder code path (core libraries continued and linux kernel layer). Expansion of Figure 2.