

Howdy y'all,

This is a slide deck intended for performance in front of a live audience. It is not--and cannot be--appropriate for reading at the same time. Only Dan Geer is good enough for that, and we can't yet preach as well as he does.

So if you want to learn these techniques, please read the fucking papers that we cite. Read PoCllGTFO, read WOOT, and read our technical reports. Looking at a slide show just ain't enough.

**73 from Austin,
--Travis**



PHY 802.15.4

TRAVIS GOODSPEED, SERGEY BRATUS

DEMISTIPHY 802.15.4

TRAVIS GOODSPEED, SERGEY BRATUS


KNOWING THE PHY WELCOME TO BABYLON



Wright's Principle

“Security won't get better until tools for **practical exploration of the attack surface** are made available”

--Joshua Wright, 2011
Toorcon KillerBee talk



Scapy dot15d4

| Octets: 2 | 1 | 4/10 | 0/5/6/10/14 | 2 | variable | variable | variable | 2 |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|-----|
| Frame Control | Sequence Number | Addressing fields | Auxiliary Security Header | Superframe Specification | GTS fields (Figure 45) | Pending address fields (Figure 46) | Beacon Payload | FCS |
| MHR | | | | MAC Payload | | | | MFR |

MHR

MAC Payload

MFR

Scapy dot15d4

| Bit: 0-2 | 3-4 | 5-7 |
|----------------|---------------------|----------|
| Security Level | Key Identifier Mode | Reserved |

| Bits: 0-3 | 4-7 | 8-11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
|--------------|------------------|----------------|------------------------------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|
| Beacon Order | Superframe Order | Final CAP Slot | Battery Life Extension (BLE) | Reserved | PAN Coordinator | Association Permit |

| Bits: 0-2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7-9 | 10-11 | 12-13 | 14-15 |
|------------|------------------|---------------|--------------|--------------------|----------|-----------------------|---------------|------------------------|
| Frame Type | Security Enabled | Frame Pending | Ack. Request | PAN ID Compression | Reserved | Dest. Addressing Mode | Frame Version | Source Addressing Mode |

| Octets: 1 | 4 | 0/1/5/9 |
|------------------|---------------|----------------|
| Security Control | Frame Counter | Key Identifier |

| Octets: 2 | 1 | 4/10 | 0/5/6/10/14 | 2 | variable | variable | variable | 2 |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|-----|
| Frame Control | Sequence Number | Addressing fields | Auxiliary Security Header | Superframe Specification | GTS fields (Figure 45) | Pending address fields (Figure 46) | Beacon Payload | FCS |
| MAC Payload | | | | | | | | MFR |

| 0/2 | 0/2/8 | 0/2 | 0/2/8 |
|----------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| Destination PAN Identifier | Destination Address | Source PAN Identifier | Source Address |

| Octets: 1 | 0/1 | variable |
|-------------------|----------------|----------|
| GTS Specification | GTS Directions | GTS List |

| Octets: 1 | variable |
|-------------------------------|--------------|
| Pending Address Specification | Address List |


| Bits: 0-2 | 3-6 | 7 |
|----------------------|----------|------------|
| GTS Descriptor Count | Reserved | GTS Permit |

| Bits: 0-6 | 7 |
|---------------------|----------|
| GTS Directions Mask | Reserved |

| Bits: 0-2 | 3 | 4-6 | 7 |
|-----------------------------------|----------|--------------------------------------|----------|
| Number of Short Addresses Pending | Reserved | Number of Extended Addresses Pending | Reserved |


| Bits: 0-15 | 16-19 | 20-23 |
|----------------------|-------------------|------------|
| Device Short Address | GTS Starting Slot | GTS Length |

Scapy dot15d4




Hardware:


- * existing hardware
 - * **Atmel RZUSBTICK**
 - * **Freakduino Chibi**
 - * Zena Packet Analyzer
 - * Sewio Open Sniffer
 - * **Tmote Sky/TelosB**
 - * ~~SDRs: USRP/etc~~



Hardware:

- * existing hardware
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
APIMOTE V4 BETA

PCB FRONT

RIVER LOOP SECURITY



Fairy tales of PHY



| Bytes: | 2 | 1 | 0 to 20 | n | 2 |
|--------|---------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------------------|
| | Frame Control Field (FCF) | Data Sequence Number | Address Information | Frame payload | Frame Check Sequence (FCS) |

1. Receive RF waves
2. ...
3. Get an LNK Frame!



PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3


Collect
underpants

?

Profit



Fairy tales of PHY



FC

Seq.No

Addr Info

\$\$\$

FCS

1. Receive RF waves

2. ...

3. Get an LNK Frame!




Fairy tales of PHY



Noise



Noise




Magic happens




Magic happens

The Layer Cake is a PHY!



802.15.4 frame (PHY+LNK)



| Octets: 2 | 1 | (see 7.2.2.4.1) | 1 | variable | 2 |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Frame control | Sequence number | Addressing fields | Command frame identifier | Command payload | FCS |
| MHR | | | MAC payload | | MFR |


how a frame is received

symbols
2.4 GHz
(or 868/915/etc MHz)



bytes or
frames

SPI bus
(or similar)



diving into the PHY layer





Figure 17. Schematic view of the IEEE 802.15.4 Frame Format [1]

Why Preamble?

Forget sending data -- can you even agree on time?




Why Preamble?

Forget sending data -- can you even agree on time?




**Clock
drift**



**Clock
drift**

Why Preamble?

Forget sending data -- can you even agree on time?



00 00 00 00



Synchronized

How much preamble is really needed?

802.15.4 standard says 8 symbols: 00 00 00 00




has a register to set preamble length:
00 00 00 00 00 00 <none>

Depends on clocks, temperature



Fingerprinting with variable preamble

| Variable Preamble | SFD | Length | Payload |
|-------------------|-----|--------|---------|
|-------------------|-----|--------|---------|





Why SFD?

00 00 00 00 a7 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff ...

Preamble

Sync

Body



Shift Register

Out-of-frame



Why SFD?

00 00 00 00 a7 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff ...

Preamble

Sync


Body




Shift Register

In-frame

Out-of-frame



Why SFD?



Is SFD in the symbol set?

Yes



802.15.4

802.11b/g*

(*) kind of..

No




PCI Express

AX.25 packet radio


802.3

Packet-in-packet



What if this gets damaged by noise?

Packet-in-packet



What if this gets damaged by noise?

Packet-in-packet in Hex

| Outer | Hex | Inner |
|----------|--------------------------------------|----------|
| Preamble | 00 00 00 00 | |
| Sync | a7 | |
| Body | 19 | |
| | 01 08 82 | |
| | ca fe ba be | |
| | 00 00 00 00 | Preamble |
| | a7 | Sync |
| | <i>0a 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff c9 d1</i> | Body |
| | 15 e8 | |

You too can send a PHY frame without a radio! *)

**(*) If you can control application layer bytes
and there's noise **)**

() There's always noise**



Read the Fscking Paper

“Packets in Packets: Orson Welles’ In-Band Signaling Attacks for Modern Radios”, WOOT 2011



So how to send a symbol?

| | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 11011001110000110101001000101110 | 0 |
| 11101101100111000011010100100010 | 1 |
| 00101110110110011100001101010010 | 2 |
| 00100010111011011001110000110101 | 3 |
| 01010010001011101101100111000011 | 4 |
| 00110101001000101110110110011100 | 5 |
| 11000011010100100010111011011001 | 6 |
| 10011100001101010010001011101101 | 7 |

| | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 10001100100101100000011101111011 | 8 |
| 10111000110010010110000001110111 | 9 |
| 01111011100011001001011000000111 | A |
| 01110111101110001100100101100000 | B |
| 00000111011110111000110010010110 | C |
| 01100000011101111011100011001001 | D |
| 10010110000001110111101110001100 | E |
| 11001001011000000111011110111000 | F |



Chips!



Error correction

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

↑
16
↓

Some of these chips are going to arrive flipped.
Receiver will take symbol with the closest code
by Hamming distance *)
This is entirely transparent to all layers above,
including SFD matching



Error ~~correction~~ connection

Symbol codes rotate into each other:


| | |
|---|----------------------------------|
| 0 | 11011001110000110101001000101110 |
| 1 | 11101101100111000011010100100010 |
| 2 | 00101110110110011100001101010010 |
| 3 | 00100010111011011001110000110101 |
| 4 | 01010010001011101101100111000011 |
| 5 | 00110101001000101110110110011100 |
| 6 | 11000011010100100010111011011001 |
| 7 | 10011100001101010010001011101101 |
| 8 | 10001100100101100000011101111011 |
| 9 | 10111000110010010110000001110111 |
| A | 01111011100011001001011000000111 |
| B | 01110111101110001100100101100000 |
| C | 00000111011110111000110010010110 |
| D | 01100000011101111011100011001001 |
| E | 10010110000001110111101110001100 |
| F | 11001001011000000111011110111000 |

Error ~~correction~~ connection

Symbol codes rotate into each other (now in hex):

| | |
|---|----------|
| 0 | D9C3522E |
| 1 | ED9C3522 |
| 2 | 2ED9C352 |
| 3 | 22ED9C35 |
| 4 | 522ED9C3 |
| 5 | 3522ED9C |
| 6 | C3522ED9 |
| 7 | 9C3522ED |

| | |
|---|----------|
| 8 | 8C96077B |
| 9 | B8C96077 |
| A | 7B8C9607 |
| B | 77B8C960 |
| C | 077B8C96 |
| D | 6077B8C9 |
| E | 96077B8C |
| F | C96077B8 |



Stream of symbols is actually a stream of chips
Boundaries between symbols are _imaginary_

Can my radio receive a frame that wasn't sent?

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| D9C3522E | D9C3522E | D9C3522E | D9C3522E | D9C3522E | D9C3522E | D9C3522E | D9C3522E |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| ED9C3522 | ED9C3522 | ED9C3522 | ED9C3522 | ED9C3522 | ED9C3522 | ED9C3522 | ED9C3522 |

Hamming distance at most 4

“I’ll be SFD
now”

| | | |
|----|---|------------------|
| BO | — | 77B8C960D9C3522E |
| | | |
| A7 | — | 7B8C96079C3522ED |

Your radio can receive frames that share no symbol with sent frames *)


(*) If you can cause misalignment by $1/8$ of a nybble

Modulation of chips


OOK, kinda like AM

FSK, kinda like FM

PSK, kinda like PSK




OOK




- * On-Off Keying
- * First used for Morse Code (CW)!

OOK




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OOK




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OOK




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
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
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
- * On-Off Keying
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OOK




- * On-Off Keying
- * First used for Morse Code (CW)!

Wifi to Morse




- * Suppose you MITM an SSL session, but don't know key.
- * Enable and disable line to inject Morse code.
- * Sniff at 2.4GHz with extreme range!

FSK



- * Frequency Shift Keying
- * Kinda like FM, but finite shifts.
- * Used for Bluetooth.


FSK Ghosts



- * Transmit on Channel 8.
- * Flipped bits are received on Channel 7.



PSK



- * Phase Shift Keying
- * Phase varies to mark bits.
- * BPSK--2 phases
QPSK--4 phases 802.15.4

A zero is a zero and a one is a one, except when they aren't.

Do radios have dialects?

- * We can send **arbitrary symbol streams** with CC2420 (including preambles, SFDs, “inner” PIP packets, “packet-out-of-packet”, etc.)
- * Active fingerprinting to find out what corruptions work.
<http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/abstracts/TR2014-749/>
- * Profit: capability to send packets that some radios see, and others don't!
(**Separate** from signal strength, range, etc.)

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That's a 802.15.4 WIDS evasion!


Isotope: Fingerprinting FTV!

- * Fingerprinting: meh?
- * “[Digital radio] chip makes are all different” - Captain Obvious



Isotope: Fingerprinting FTV!


- * Fingerprinting: meh?
- * “[Digital radio] chip makes are all different” - Captain Obvious



- * “Some nuclei aren’t like the others”
- * Like **U** 238 v. **U** 235 ?

Isotope: Fingerprinting FTV!

- * Fingerprinting: meh?
- * “[Digital radio] chip makes are all different” - Captain Obvious



Cumberland Gap



Normal Frame:

| | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------------------|----------|-------------|
| Symbols: 8 | 2 | 2 | | variable |
| Preamble | SFD | Frame length (7 bits) | Reserved | PSDU |
| 00 00 00 00 | A7 | PHR | | PHY payload |

What we send:

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-----------|-------------|----------|-----|--------|---------|
| Preamble | SFD (bad) | 0xFs | Preamble | SFD | Length | Payload |
|----------|-----------|-------------|----------|-----|--------|---------|



(..drink a little whiskey, take a little nap...)

Franconia Notch



Normal Frame:

| | | | | |
|-------------|--------|-----------------------|----------|-------------|
| Symbols: 8 | 2 | 2 | | variable |
| Preamble | SFD | Frame length (7 bits) | Reserved | PSDU |
| 00 00 00 00 | SHR A7 | PHR | | PHY payload |

What we send:

| | | | | |
|------|------|-----|--------|---------|
| 0x0s | 0xFs | SFD | Length | Payload |
|------|------|-----|--------|---------|



(..drink a little whiskey, take a little nap...)

Franconia Bridge



Normal Frame:

| | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------------------|----------|-------------|
| Symbols: 8 | 2 | 2 | | variable |
| Preamble | SFD | Frame length (7 bits) | Reserved | PSDU |
| 00 00 00 00 | A7 | PHR | | PHY payload |



What we send:

| | | | | |
|----------|-------------|-----|--------|---------|
| Preamble | 0xFs | SFD | Length | Payload |
|----------|-------------|-----|--------|---------|



(..drink a little whiskey, take a little nap...)

Franconia notch



Each box corresponds to 4 bits. Hence the preamble corresponds to 8 x 4 "0" s or 4 bytes with the value 0.

SW0 = SYNCWORD[3:0] if different from 'F', else '0'

SW1 = SYNCWORD[7:4] if different from 'F', else '0'

SW2 = SYNCWORD[11:8] if different from 'F', else '0'

SW3 = SYNCWORD[15:12] if different from 'F', else '0'

Figure 18. Transmitted Synchronisation Header

Franconia notch







Figure 18. Transmitted Synchronisation Header

Franconia notch



Franconia notch



Each box corresponds to 4 bits. Hence the preamble corresponds to 8 x 4 "0" s or 4 bytes with the value 0.

SW0 = SYNCWORD[3:0] if different from 'F', else '0'


SW1 = SYNCWORD[7:4] if different from 'F', else '0'

SW2 = SYNCWORD[11:8] if different from 'F', else '0'


SW3 = SYNCWORD[15:12] if different from 'F', else '0'

Figure 18. Transmitted Synchronisation Header



Franconia notch



Local Dialect as a Shaped Charge




| Preamble | RZUSB Observed | ApiMote Observed |
|-------------|----------------|------------------|
| 00 00 00 00 | 672 | 1000 |
| 00 00 00 ff | 991 | 0 |
| 00 00 ff ff | 990 | 0 |
| 00 ff ff ff | 855 | 1 |
| ff ff ff ff | 4 | 0 |





ApiMote's CC2420 RF chip was configured to default preamble length and SFD. Address and checksum verification was disabled.

Local Dialect as a Shaped Charge




| Preamble | RZUSB Observed | ApiMote Observed |
|-------------|----------------|------------------|
| 00 00 00 00 | 672 | 1000 |
| 00 00 00 ff | 991 | 0 |
| 00 00 ff ff | 990 | 0 |
| 00 ff ff ff | 855 | 1 |
| ff ff ff ff | 4 | 0 |





ApiMote's CC2420 RF chip was configured to default preamble length and SFD. Address and checksum verification was disabled.

Local Dialect as a Shaped Charge



| Preamble | RZUSB Observed | ApiMote Observed |
|-------------|----------------|------------------|
| 00 00 00 00 | 672 | 1000 |
| 00 00 00 ff | 991 | 0 |
| 00 00 ff ff | 990 | 0 |
| 00 ff ff ff | 855 | 1 |
| ff ff ff ff | 4 | 0 |



ApiMote's CC2420 RF chip was configured to default preamble length and SFD. Address and checksum verification was disabled.

RZUSBSTICK PCAP

| No. | Time | Source | Preamble | Protocol | Length | Sequence Number | Epoch Time | Info |
|-----|------------|--------|-------------|----------|--------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------|
| 6 | 5.000083 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 1 | 1394396580.000099000 | Beacon Request |
| 7 | 9.999989 | | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 3 | 1394396585.000005000 | Beacon Request |
| 8 | 11.999992 | | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 4 | 1394396587.000008000 | Beacon Request |
| 9 | 15.999997 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 6 | 1394396591.000013000 | Beacon Request |
| 10 | 17.999999 | | 00 00 00 ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 7 | 1394396593.000015000 | Beacon Request |
| 11 | 20.000002 | | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 8 | 1394396595.000018000 | Beacon Request |
| 12 | 22.000005 | | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 9 | 1394396597.000021000 | Beacon Request |
| 13 | 26.000011 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 11 | 1394396601.000027000 | Beacon Request |
| 14 | 28.000013 | | 00 00 00 ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 12 | 1394396603.000029000 | Beacon Request |
| 15 | 30.000016 | | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 13 | 1394396605.000032000 | Beacon Request |
| 16 | 32.000018 | | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 14 | 1394396607.000034000 | Beacon Request |
| 17 | 36.000023 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 16 | 1394396611.000039000 | Beacon Request |
| 18 | 38.000027 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 17 | 1394396613.000043000 | Beacon Request |
| 19 | 40.000030 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 18 | 1394396615.000046000 | Beacon Request |
| 20 | 46.000040 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 21 | 1394396621.000056000 | Beacon Request |
| 21 | 48.000043 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 22 | 1394396623.000059000 | Beacon Request |
| 22 | 50.000046 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 23 | 1394396625.000062000 | Beacon Request |
| 23 | 55.999991 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 26 | 1394396631.000007000 | Beacon Request |
| 24 | 58.000056 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 27 | 1394396633.000072000 | Beacon Request |
| 25 | 60.000059 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 28 | 1394396635.000075000 | Beacon Request |
| 26 | 62.000062 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 29 | 1394396637.000078000 | Beacon Request |
| 27 | 66.000067 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 31 | 1394396641.000083000 | Beacon Request |
| 28 | 68.000071 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 32 | 1394396643.000087000 | Beacon Request |
| 29 | 69.999993 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 33 | 1394396645.000009000 | Beacon Request |
| 30 | 72.000077 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 34 | 1394396647.000093000 | Beacon Request |
| 31 | 76.000082 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 36 | 1394396651.000098000 | Beacon Request |
| 32 | 78.999984 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 37 | 1394396654.000000000 | Beacon Request |
| 33 | 80.999987 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 38 | 1394396656.000003000 | Beacon Request |
| 34 | 86.999996 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 41 | 1394396662.000012000 | Beacon Request |
| 35 | 88.999998 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 42 | 1394396664.000014000 | Beacon Request |
| 36 | 91.000000 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 43 | 1394396666.000016000 | Beacon Request |
| 37 | 93.000003 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 44 | 1394396668.000019000 | Beacon Request |
| 38 | 101.000017 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 48 | 1394396676.000033000 | Beacon Request |

RZUSBSTICK PCAP

| No. | Time | Source | Preamble | Protocol | Length | Sequence Number | Epoch Time | Info |
|-----|-----------|-------------------|-------------|----------|--------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------|
| 6 | 5.000083 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 1 | 1394396580.000099000 | Beacon Request |
| 7 | 9.999989 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 3 | 1394396585.000005000 | Beacon Request |
| 8 | 11.999992 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 4 | 1394396587.000008000 | Beacon Request |
| 9 | 15.999997 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 6 | 1394396591.000013000 | Beacon Request |
| 10 | 17.999999 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 00 00 ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 7 | 1394396593.000015000 | Beacon Request |
| 11 | 20.000002 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 8 | 1394396595.000018000 | Beacon Request |
| 12 | 22.000005 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 9 | 1394396597.000021000 | Beacon Request |
| 13 | 26.000011 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 11 | 1394396601.000027000 | Beacon Request |
| 14 | 28.000013 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 00 00 ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 12 | 1394396603.000029000 | Beacon Request |
| 15 | 30.000016 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 13 | 1394396605.000032000 | Beacon Request |
| 16 | 32.000018 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 14 | 1394396607.000034000 | Beacon Request |
| 17 | 36.000023 | 00:00:00:00:00:00 | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 16 | 1394396611.000039000 | Beacon Request |
| 18 | 38.000027 | Broadcast | ... | IEEE 802 | 10 | 17 | 1394396613.000043000 | Beacon Request |
| 19 | 40.000030 | Broadcast | | IEEE 802 | 10 | 18 | 1394396615.000046000 | Beacon Request |
| 20 | 46.000040 | Broadcast | | IEEE 802 | 10 | 21 | 1394396621.000056000 | Beacon Request |
| 21 | 48.000043 | Broadcast | | IEEE 802 | 10 | 22 | 1394396623.000059000 | Beacon Request |

RZUSBSTICK PCAP

| No. | Time | Source | Preamble | Protocol | Length | Sequence Number | Epoch Time | Info |
|-----|-----------|--------|-------------|----------|--------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------|
| 6 | 5.000083 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 1 | 1394396580.000099000 | Beacon Request |
| 7 | 9.999989 | | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 3 | 1394396585.000005000 | Beacon Request |
| 8 | 11.999992 | | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 4 | 1394396587.000008000 | Beacon Request |
| 9 | 15.999997 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 6 | 1394396591.000013000 | Beacon Request |
| 10 | 17.999999 | | 00 00 00 ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 7 | 1394396593.000015000 | Beacon Request |
| 11 | 20.000002 | | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 8 | 1394396595.000018000 | Beacon Request |
| 12 | 22.000005 | | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 9 | 1394396597.000021000 | Beacon Request |
| 13 | 26.000011 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 11 | 1394396601.000027000 | Beacon Request |
| 14 | 28.000013 | | 00 00 00 ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 12 | 1394396603.000029000 | Beacon Request |
| 15 | 30.000016 | | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 13 | 1394396605.000032000 | Beacon Request |
| 16 | 32.000018 | | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 14 | 1394396607.000034000 | Beacon Request |
| 17 | 36.000023 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 16 | 1394396611.000039000 | Beacon Request |
| 18 | 38.000027 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 17 | 1394396613.000043000 | Beacon Request |
| 19 | 40.000030 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 18 | 1394396615.000046000 | Beacon Request |
| 20 | 46.000040 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 21 | 1394396621.000056000 | Beacon Request |
| 21 | 48.000043 | | Broadcast | IEEE 802 | 10 | 22 | 1394396623.000059000 | Beacon Request |

ApiMote PCAP

| No. | Time | Source | Preamble | Protocol | Length | Sequence Number | Epoch Time | Info |
|-----|-----------|--------|-------------|----------|--------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------|
| 6 | 5.999984 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 1 | 1394396581.000000000 | Beacon Request |
| 7 | 15.999997 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 6 | 1394396591.000013000 | Beacon Request |
| 8 | 26.000011 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 11 | 1394396601.000027000 | Beacon Request |
| 9 | 35.999988 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 16 | 1394396611.000004000 | Beacon Request |
| 10 | 46.000040 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 21 | 1394396621.000056000 | Beacon Request |
| 11 | 55.999991 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 26 | 1394396631.000007000 | Beacon Request |
| 12 | 66.000068 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 31 | 1394396641.000084000 | Beacon Request |
| 13 | 76.000083 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 36 | 1394396651.000099000 | Beacon Request |
| 14 | 86.999996 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 41 | 1394396662.000012000 | Beacon Request |
| 15 | 97.000012 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 46 | 1394396672.000028000 | Beacon Request |

RZUSBSTICK PCAP

| No. | Time | Source | Preamble | Protocol | Length | Sequence Number | Epoch Time | Info |
|-----|-----------|-----------|-------------|----------|--------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------|
| 6 | 5.000083 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 1 | 1394396580.000099000 | Beacon Request |
| 7 | 9.999989 | | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 3 | 1394396585.000005000 | Beacon Request |
| 8 | 11.999992 | | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 4 | 1394396587.000008000 | Beacon Request |
| 9 | 15.999997 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 6 | 1394396591.000013000 | Beacon Request |
| 10 | 17.999999 | | 00 00 00 ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 7 | 1394396593.000015000 | Beacon Request |
| 11 | 20.000002 | | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 8 | 1394396595.000018000 | Beacon Request |
| 12 | 22.000005 | | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 9 | 1394396597.000021000 | Beacon Request |
| 13 | 26.000011 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 11 | 1394396601.000027000 | Beacon Request |
| 14 | 28.000013 | | 00 00 00 ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 12 | 1394396603.000029000 | Beacon Request |
| 15 | 30.000016 | | 00 00 ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 13 | 1394396605.000032000 | Beacon Request |
| 16 | 32.000018 | | 00 ff ff ff | IEEE 802 | 10 | 14 | 1394396607.000034000 | Beacon Request |
| 17 | 36.000023 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 16 | 1394396611.000039000 | Beacon Request |
| 18 | 38.000027 | Broadcast | ... | IEEE 802 | 10 | 17 | 1394396613.000043000 | Beacon Request |
| 19 | 40.000030 | Broadcast | | IEEE 802 | 10 | 18 | 1394396615.000046000 | Beacon Request |
| 20 | 46.000040 | Broadcast | | IEEE 802 | 10 | 21 | 1394396621.000056000 | Beacon Request |
| 21 | 48.000043 | Broadcast | | IEEE 802 | 10 | 22 | 1394396623.000059000 | Beacon Request |

ApiMote PCAP

| No. | Time | Source | Preamble | Protocol | Length | Sequence Number | Epoch Time | Info |
|-----|-----------|--------|-------------|----------|--------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------|
| 6 | 5.999984 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 1 | 1394396581.000000000 | Beacon Request |
| 7 | 15.999997 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 6 | 1394396591.000013000 | Beacon Request |
| 8 | 26.000011 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 11 | 1394396601.000027000 | Beacon Request |
| 9 | 35.999988 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 16 | 1394396611.000004000 | Beacon Request |
| 10 | 46.000040 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 21 | 1394396621.000056000 | Beacon Request |
| 11 | 55.999991 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 26 | 1394396631.000007000 | Beacon Request |
| 12 | 66.000068 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 31 | 1394396641.000084000 | Beacon Request |
| 13 | 76.000083 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 36 | 1394396651.000099000 | Beacon Request |
| 14 | 86.999996 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 41 | 1394396662.000012000 | Beacon Request |
| 15 | 97.000012 | | 00 00 00 00 | IEEE 802 | 10 | 46 | 1394396672.000028000 | Beacon Request |

There be pwnage in PHY!

~~Know your PHY!~~ Thou shalt know thy PHY!

Byte (even symbol) boundaries are imaginary

The deeper a layer, the simpler are its machines;
they know nothing of sender's intent

Layers of abstraction
become boundaries
of competence.

ENJOY BABYLON!

