Solving the Grid Defender’s Dilemma: Tamper Protection for Distributed Cyber-Physical Systems

Jason Reeves and Sean W. Smith
Department of Computer Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
{reeves, sws}@cs.dartmouth.edu

Keywords: Tamper Detection, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber-Physical Systems.

Abstract: Embedded devices installed as part of the smart grid rollout present a major dilemma for grid defenders, because they are soft targets that could allow an attacker to access critical assets (generators, control centers, etc.) deeper in the utility’s network. While both physical tampering and intrusion protection are large, well-studied fields, state-of-the-art protection schemes suffer from several flaws: They are not powerful enough to respond properly to different tamper events, their severe responses can lead to reduced grid availability, and they often require more setup resources than a utility operator can provide. To protect these networks, we present TEDDI (Tamper Event Detection on Distributed Infrastructure), a distributed, sensor-based tamper protection architecture for embedded devices on utility networks. TEDDI uses data gathered from across the network to make more-informed and more-accurate tamper decisions, and can customize its response based on the event it sees. It can also be configured and installed quickly, without needing a large base of knowledge beforehand. In this paper, we lay out the TEDDI architecture, and discuss how TEDDI solves the grid defender’s dilemma better than current work.

1 INTRODUCTION

As part of the push towards a smarter electric grid, utilities have installed a number of edge devices (resource-constrained embedded devices that live on the periphery of a network, e.g. at a consumer’s home or on a telephone pole) on their SCADA networks. These devices present a major security challenge for the power grid, since they are relatively easy to access, they have little physical security, and they have direct access to a utility’s SCADA network. Therefore, edge devices provide a potential gateway to any of the devices on a utility’s broader communication and control network, which makes protecting edge devices a high priority.

While a large corpus of work exists in the area of tamper detection and physical security, the grid’s focus on availability and resilience presents a dilemma for grid defenders. Choosing an incorrect or unnecessarily severe response to an event could unnecessarily reduce the grid’s availability, which is a worse outcome than a malicious attack. Most current tamper protection solutions, however, are unable to differentiate between important tamper events and do not have the power to tailor their responses accordingly, which increases the chances of choosing the wrong response.

To address this dilemma, we propose TEDDI (Tamper Event Detection on Distributed Infrastructure), a distributed, sensor-based system that can use information from the larger network to help inform local tamper decisions. TEDDI collects information about the physical environment of edge devices, and uses this data to determine what events, whether malicious or benign, might be affecting these devices. Once our system makes this decision, we determine and execute the optimal sequence of responses for each affected device.

Our contributions are as follows:

- We have built a novel system that addresses the security concerns surrounding edge devices in a SCADA network. Our system handles a wider range of events than existing protection solutions, and also allows for multiple responses.
• Our system features a novel way to make tamper decisions, using factor graphs (Frey, 2003) to fuse together sensor data and quickly determine what event is occurring.
• Our system will be more useable for power engineers who have performance goals and operational-related events in mind, but may not have a large training data set at hand or have time to fine-tune a complex protection system.
• While operators have a clear idea of their security goals and the attacks they want to guard against, their resources are limited: They may not have the time nor the training data to configure a complex protection system for their network.

We structure the rest of this paper as follows: Section 2 discusses important background information, Section 3 introduces the relevant related work in this space, Section 4 introduces TEDDI and explains its individual components, Section 5 highlights TEDDI’s advantages over prior work, Section 6 outlines the next steps in our research, and Section 7 offers our conclusions.

2 BACKGROUND

In this section, we discuss the dilemma faced by operators trying to protect the grid, and the benefits of choosing factor graphs as our data fusion algorithm.

2.1 The Grid Defender’s Dilemma

In defending the power grid, operators face a concerning scenario:

• Grid SCADA networks are open to attacks that could have severe, long-lasting consequences: A 2014 Wall Street Journal article (Smith, 2014) declared that malicious attackers could cause a nationwide blackout by taking down fewer than ten critical substations during a period of high demand on the grid, and that such a blackout “could plunge the country into darkness for weeks, if not months” (Smith, 2014).

• As stated earlier, edge devices pose a large security risk to utilities for three reasons: They are relatively easy to access, they have little physical security, and they have direct access to a utility’s SCADA network. An attacker could potentially use an edge device as a launching point for further attacks on high-value targets deeper in the network. Such attacks have been shown to be plausible and effective: For example, a single malformed packet “can crash an entire SCADA transmission system” (Peterson, 2013).

• However, availability reigns supreme for SCADA networks, so operators have to be careful about properly identifying and responding to the events affecting the grid. Choosing an incorrect or unnecessarily severe response to an event could reduce the grid’s availability by leading to increased technician visits, frequent device replacements, and unnecessary service losses.

To solve this dilemma, grid defenders need an easy-to-use tool that requires minimal prior knowledge about important events, but also has the power and flexibility to differentiate between these events and choose an appropriate response for each one. This is the gap we want to fill with TEDDI.

2.2 Factor Graphs

In TEDDI, we use factor graphs (Frey, 2003) as our fusion algorithm for our sensor data. Formally, a factor graph is a bipartite graph that connects a set of nodes \( V \) that represents system variables with a set of nodes \( F \) that represents functions relating these variables. If a function is dependent on a variable, an edge is added to the graph between the nodes that represent this variable and function.

Data fusion within tamper protection systems is usually done using a standard technique such as Bayesian networks (Pearl, 1988) or a custom algorithm such as SCADAHawk’s snapshots (Sousan et al., 2013). These techniques, however, have limited detection power: For example, Bayesian analyses are unable to capture complex dependencies between events due to their inherent independence assumptions, and adapting them to cover these dependencies can make these models infeasibly complex (Cao et al., 2015). In contrast, factor graphs allow for “arbitrary factorizations of joint distributions” (Frey, 2003), giving them the power to perform any task that a Bayesian network could while using a simpler model that can capture the defender’s intuition about suspicious activity (Cao et al., 2015). This added power means factor graphs can give us improved event detection and protection capabilities over current SCADA protection systems, while also giving utilities more flexibility to balance security with their larger availability goals.

3 RELATED WORK

In this section, we discuss some of the related work in both hardware tamper protection and general intru-
3.1 Hardware Tamper Protection

The roots of hardware tamper protection run deep, and include seminal works such as Tygar and Yee’s Dyad platform (Tygar and Yee, 1994) and Smith, Palmer, and Weingart’s work on the IBM 4758 (Smith et al., 1998; Smith and Weingart, 1999). More recent academic work has focused on placing conductive patches randomly within potting material (Dragone, 2013) and obfuscating the system’s hardware (Desai, 2013). Other solutions include chip-level trusted platform modules (for example, (Atmel Corporation, 2015)) and cryptographic coprocessors (IBM, 2011). However, these solutions are geared towards single-device protection, and do not have the response granularity needed for grid protection.

3.2 Intrusion Protection Systems

Many protection systems in this space use Bayesian networks for data fusion. For example, Process Query Systems (Roblee et al., 2005) use conditional probabilities to relate events to one of its attack/failure models, while the Bayesian trust assessment framework (Wang and Hauser, 2011) tries to evaluate the trust an operator can place in a device based on the evidence they collect. The Probabilistic Event Correlation system (Valdes and Skinner, 2001) uses Bayesian-based data fusion as a way to reduce false positives and determine which alerts should be shown to the administrator.

Some systems forgo standard fusion methods in favor of building a custom detection algorithm. Examples of this approach include SCADAHawk (Sousan et al., 2013), which organizes data into snapshots that it uses for anomaly detection, and AmiLyzer (Berthier and Sanders, 2013), which organizes smart meter traffic into flows that are scrutinized for policy violations or other unwanted behaviors.

SCPSE (Zonouz et al., 2012) combines intrusion detection alerts with power system information to more accurately estimate the security state of an electrical network. The system builds an attack graph that traces the possible paths an attacker could follow via exploiting network nodes, and later uses the information it gathers to estimate the attacker’s path and thus reveal what nodes may be compromised. The Response and Recovery Engine (Zonouz et al., 2014), on the other hand, uses attack response trees (ARTs) to define the security goals of the system and track how far an attacker has progressed in violating these goals, thus determining the potential responses to apply.

Finally, we should note that we are not the first to propose factor graphs as a security mechanism: Cao et al. (Cao et al., 2015) demonstrated how such graphs can be used to detect compromised user accounts, even before the accounts had compromised the actual system. To the best of our knowledge, however, TEDDI is the first system to use factor graphs for physical tamper protection.

4 TEDDI OVERVIEW

In this section, we offer a high-level example of how TEDDI works, and cover each of its components in detail.

4.1 Why Distributed?

We built TEDDI as a distributed system to better allow it to gather contextual information for its tamper decisions. Our setup is inspired by XACML (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards, 2013), which includes policy information, decision, and enforcement points as distributed components that work together to rule on policy decisions. Since we also want to make and enforce policy decisions on a distributed system, we adopt a similar architecture.

TEDDI is made up of three components:

- Tamper Information Points (TIPs, Section 4.5): Programs that collect sensor data and attempt to make local tamper decisions.
- Tamper Decision Points (TDPs, Section 4.6): Programs that take the sensor data from TIPs, determine the overall state of the network they monitor, and make tamper decisions when asked by the TIP.
- Tamper Enforcement Points (TEPs, Section 4.7): Programs that listen for tamper decisions and execute responses based on those decisions.

4.2 Attacker Model

Before we begin, we first define the capabilities of the attacker we are considering.

We assume that the attacker must go through an edge device to access the SCADA network, and cannot access the network just by tapping the wire. More specifically, we assume that the attacker must penetrate some sort of physical boundary, which could be as simple as the device’s own exterior, to access the edge device’s hardware. Network attacks originating from outside the SCADA network are considered
First, a utility operator builds the tamper system using the generation tool (Step 1), and then deploys the various components to their proper locations in the network (Step 2). When a TIP senses shaking (Step 3), it sends an alert to the TDP (Step 4), which then uses its full information base to decide exactly what is happening (Step 5). This decision is then sent to the appropriate TEPs (Step 6), who then decide the proper response to the event (Step 7).

4.4 TEDDI Factor Graphs

At the heart of our tamper decision engine is a factor graph (Frey, 2003) that looks for sequences within its sensor data to determine what event is occurring on the system. Our graph, as shown in Figure 2, is constructed from two important datasets:

**Events:** The set $E = \{e_1, \ldots, e_j\}$ of events we want to detect.

**Indicators:** The set $I = \{i_1, \ldots, i_k\}$ of phenomena connected to the events in $E$. For example, if $E$ includes an earthquake in its set, $I$ might include shaking. The presence or absence of an indicator $i$ is calculated by looking at its corresponding sensor $s$ to see if the sensor reading has crossed an operator-defined threshold.

We build our factor graph via an efficient three-step process:

1. For each concerning event $e_j$, the operator defines the sequence of indicators that signals $e_j$’s presence.
2. The operator then ranks the events by their importance, declaring which events are the most important to detect.
3. Finally, the indicator sequences are arranged within the factor graph in order of their importance.

Whenever we poll our sensors for data, we calculate the presence of indicators based on this data, and then run through our factor graph to see what events are occurring, starting from the most-important event.

When we generate the final factor graph, we create two versions: A full version for tamper decision points, and a limited version for tamper information points. We create the two versions to account for differences in the information bases between decision and information points.
Figure 2: An example factor graph generated by our TEDDI system. The blank nodes represent intermediate steps in each event sequence.

- If an information source is only available to tamper decision points, sensors and indicators associated with that information source are not included in the limited factor graph.
- If a tamper information point is unable to distinguish between two events due to a lack of information, those events are combined in the limited factor graph.

4.5 Tamper Information Points (TIPs)

Tamper information points are the eyes and ears of the system, and are responsible for collecting the sensor data needed for decision making. A TIP is assigned to each edge device in the network, and lives in the same location as that device (for example, in the same cabinet) monitoring the surrounding environment.

Every few seconds, the TIP takes a snapshot of its sensor values and analyzes this snapshot to see what events, if any, are presently affecting the device. When a sensor exceeds the threshold set by the operator, the corresponding indicator is considered present for the purposes of our factor graph, and absent otherwise. These values are used to construct the $I$ set for use in our factor graph, and also sent to a tamper decision point to keep the decision point’s worldview current and to alert the decision point that this TIP is still active.

If the TIP is able to make an event decision by itself, it sends this decision to the appropriate tamper enforcement points. However, the TIP only has a limited copy of the system’s factor graph, which means the TIP is not always able to distinguish between certain events. In these cases, it sends a request to its tamper decision point for assistance.

4.6 Tamper Decision Points (TDPs)

Tamper decision points live in higher-security areas of a utility’s SCADA network, such as within a substation, and they serve multiple TIPs within their service area. TDPs are given a full copy of the system’s factor graph, and they can access data from both from the TIPs they serve and any external data sources they query, which allows them to make a more-informed tamper decision than a single TIP.

When a TDP receives an assistance request from one of its TIPs, the TDP first tries to determine the overall state of the area it monitors. It does this by combining the data it receives from all of its TIPs to see what sensor values are held by the majority of its TIPs. If a TDP’s factor graph includes $l$ indicators, the TDP’s indicator state $I_{overall}$ is set as follows:

$$I_{overall} = \{\text{maj}(i_1), \text{maj}(i_2), \ldots, \text{maj}(i_l)\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

$$\text{maj}(i_p) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if the majority of TIPs see } i_p \text{ as present} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

Once the TDP calculates $I_{overall}$, it combines the data with the local indicators provided by the requesting TIP and runs the entire set through the full factor graph to calculate its own event probabilities and make a final decision as to what event is occurring. Two edge cases, however, may interfere with this process:

- If a TIP stops reporting to the TDP, its data is eventually declared stale, and the offending TIP is removed from the summation. The TDP will also run the factor graph with a “lost TIP” flag set to see if further response if needed.
- If any of the $\text{maj}(i_p)$ functions do not find a clear majority (i.e. the TIPs are evenly split on sensor $p$), the TDP can reach out to a second TDP for assistance. The second TDP attempts to break the tie by combining its information with that of the first TDP, running the combined $I_{overall}$ through its factor graph, and sending the result back to the first TDP.

Once a decision is made, if an event is thought to be present, the appropriate tamper enforcement points are alerted to initiate a response.

4.7 Tamper Enforcement Points (TEPs)

Tamper enforcement points are positioned between the TIP and its TDP on the SCADA network, and they
are responsible for responding to decisions made by these devices.

For each TIP, an edge TEP is installed at the TIP’s location, and a central TEP is placed closer to the TIP’s TDP. The two TEPs allow us to execute responses in the location that makes the most sense in the current context. For example, erasing secret data on the edge device is best handled by the edge TEP, while filtering network traffic might be more appropriate for the central TEP.

The TEP is not limited to making a single response to a decision, but instead can execute an ordered series of responses to mitigate any problems. Exactly which responses to take, and what order to take them in, is predetermined by the system administrator. In cases where responses need to be taken on both the edge and central TEPs, the TEPs coordinate their response to ensure that responses occur in the proper order.

5 ADVANTAGES OF TEDDI

In this section, we compare TEDDI to selected prior works within the context of an example usage scenario, and highlight how TEDDI is able to solve the grid defender’s dilemma outlined in Section 2.1.

5.1 An Expanded Example

Suppose a utility wants to monitor a set of edge devices deployed in a section of their SCADA network. The devices are all installed inside metal cabinets, and are all equipped with a small set of sensors, including an accelerometer, light sensor, temperature sensor, and a switch that indicates whether or not the cabinet door is open.

The utility is particularly concerned about bypass attacks, in which an attacker breaks the lock off of an edge device cabinet, and then opens the cabinet and replaces the edge device with a device of their choosing, such as an exploit-equipped laptop. (This attack scenario was initially presented to us by one of our industry partners.) The attacker could also enter the cabinet in other ways, such as by drilling through it or cutting into it with a torch, whereas a high temperature alert indicates a torch is being used.

A “normal” bypass attack can be defined as follows: It starts with shaking (from smashing the cabinet lock), continues with the cover switch opening, and concludes with light hitting the light sensor. This simple sequence can quickly be encoded in our factor graph.

The above bypass attack might look similar to a technician visit, but there is a big difference: A utility generally knows when its boxes are being serviced, and has a record of this within its incident database. We introduce this information as an indicator in our full factor graph (with a corresponding mechanism that queries the incident database and serves as our sensor), and combine the bypass and technician events in our limited factor graph.

A summary of our comparison results is shown in Table 1.

5.2 Setup Requirements

As stated in Section 2.1, grid operators do not have a lot of time or data at their disposal when configuring a SCADA protection system, and need to be able to get things up and running quickly. This requirement causes problems for the RRE, since it requires that the operator construct a full attack response tree (ART), complete with every potential step taken by an attacker and the responses that correspond to each step, for each security goal they want to maintain (Zonouz et al., 2014). While SCADAHawk does not place as heavy a burden on the operator, it suffers from the need to capture the behavior snapshots it needs for anomaly detection (Sousan et al., 2013). This step is crucial to guard against false positives, but if the utility does not have data on hand, SCADAHawk must run for a prolonged period to collect the data it needs.

In contrast, TEDDI tries to minimize the preliminary work it requires, and begins monitoring the network the minute it is installed. Our factor graphs only require the event and indicator sets, as well as the relationship between the two (e.g., what indicators are generated by each event). In this case, the event relationships can be defined as follows:

- If the light sensor is triggered while the cover switch is closed, this indicates that the box has been breached in an inappropriate manner, a telltale sign that an attack is going on. The presence of shaking indicates that a drill attack is in progress, whereas a high temperature alert indicates a torch is being used.
- A “normal” bypass attack can be defined as follows: It starts with shaking (from smashing the cabinet lock), continues with the cover switch opening, and concludes with light hitting the light sensor. This simple sequence can quickly be encoded in our factor graph.
- The above bypass attack might look similar to a technician visit, but there is a big difference: A utility generally knows when its boxes are being serviced, and has a record of this within its incident database. We introduce this information as an indicator in our full factor graph (with a corresponding mechanism that queries the incident database and serves as our sensor), and combine the bypass and technician events in our limited factor graph.
Table 1: A summary of our discussion in Section 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Solution</th>
<th>Easy Setup</th>
<th>Detects Physical Tampering</th>
<th>Event Range</th>
<th>Flexible Response</th>
<th>Solves Grid Defender’s Dilemma?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBM 4765</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCADAHawk</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEDDI</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With these rules in place, TEDDI can start monitoring the SCADA network immediately.

The IBM 4765 is the simplest of the four protection systems to set up, as all of its physical protections are in place and armed from the start (IBM, 2011). While the device is initially equipped to perform “cryptographic functions common in the finance industry and in Internet business applications” (IBM, 2011), it is also possible to create custom software for the device if needed. However, it is a device-centered protection system that provides no protection to a SCADA network if it gets bypassed.

5.3 Event Detection

There are two elements to consider when thinking about event detection: How quickly a system can respond to an event, and the range of events a system can detect. SCADAHawk and the RRE are reactive systems, and look for evidence that an attacker has already breached the network, either through IDS alerts (Zonouz et al., 2014) or anomalous system behavior (Sousan et al., 2013). Neither SCADAHawk nor the RRE look for physical tamper events, so in the case of the bypass attack, the attacker is on the network and putting their attack plan into action by the time these two systems notice a problem. By observing physical events, however, TEDDI can take a proactive stance against attacks. In the above scenario, for example, TEDDI’s sensors could detect the shaking caused by the chiseling and the opening of the cabinet’s door, deduce that an attack may be occurring, and start taking protective measures.

The IBM 4765 responds to physical events as well (IBM, 2011), but its lack of context information can lead to costly false positives, since the device is unable to say exactly what event triggered its sensors and thus must assume the worst. TEDDI, on the other hand, takes advantage of its distributed nature to obtain this context information and differentiate between benign and malicious events. If we again consider the bypass attack, the affected information can send an alert to its decision point, which can then query an external database to see if we expect a technician to be shaking the box.

5.4 Response Strategy

Differentiating between events is not useful unless we can adjust our system’s response appropriately. Most tamper protection systems, however, suffer from one of two major flaws in this area: They either only attempt to detect a problem, such as SCADAHawk (Sousan et al., 2013), or they have a single “nuclear” response to any sort of tampering, such as the IBM 4765 (IBM, 2011).

To protect the grid, however, we require a flexible response strategy that can deal with events of varying concern. The RRE supports this by connecting responses with specific nodes within its attack response trees (Zonouz et al., 2014), while TEDDI equips its TEPs with ordered response strategies that it can take when certain events are seen. Exactly what the TEP does depends on the event, and the response could range from stopping the device completely to not intervening at all.

5.5 Solving the Dilemma

A summary of our comparison results is shown in Table 1. Overall, TEDDI is the system that is best suited to solve the grid defender’s dilemma: It is easy to configure, can differentiate between important tamper events, and can tailor its responses to suit the event at hand.

6 NEXT STEPS

Currently, we have built and tested a small TEDDI prototype (1 TDP, 5 TIPs), and have demonstrated how event decisions can change based on the status of the edge devices. We plan to expand our prototype and deploy it on a realistic grid network, and are working with the electrical network management team here at Dartmouth to construct this network.

Because TEDDI requires that a customized program be built for every TIP, TDP, and TEP in the system, we are also building a generation tool that will perform this task. This tool includes a decision point layout tool that calculates the optimal locations to
place TDPs, and will also suggest potential responses for common or similar events.

7 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we highlighted the security threat posed by edge devices in a SCADA network, and proposed our TEDDI system as a means of addressing this threat. SCADA networks must handle a wide range of tamper events while supporting a specialized combination of security goals, and we showed how TEDDI’s distributed nature, use of factor graphs, and flexible approach to tamper response give it a distinct advantage in handling these event and goals.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This material is based upon work supported by the Department of Energy under Award Number DE-OE0000097. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors.

REFERENCES


