A Game-Theoretic Formulation of Multi-Agent Resource Allocation


Jonathan Bredin, Rajiv T. Maheswaran, Çagri Imer, Tamer Başar, David Kotz, and Daniela Rus. A Game-Theoretic Formulation of Multi-Agent Resource Allocation. Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents, pages 349–356. ACM, June 2000. doi:10.1145/336595.337525. ©Copyright ACM. Revision of bredin:game-tr.


This paper considers resource allocation in a network with mobile agents competing for computational priority. We formulate this problem as a multi-agent game with the players being agents purchasing service from a common server. We show that there exists a computable Nash equilibrium when agents have perfect information into the future. From our game, we build a market-based CPU allocation policy and a strategy with which an agent may plan its expenditures for a multi-hop itinerary. We simulate a network of hosts and agents using our strategy to show that our resource-allocation mechanism effectively prioritizes agents according to their endowments and that our planning algorithm handles network delay gracefully.

Citable with [BibTeX]

Projects: [dagents]

Keywords: [agents] [markets]

Available from the publisher: [DOI]

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[Kotz research]