BASTION-SGX: Bluetooth and Architectural Support for Trusted I/O on SGX
Travis Peters, Reshma Lal, Srikanth Varadarajan, Pradeep Pappachan, and David Kotz.
BASTION-SGX: Bluetooth and Architectural Support for Trusted I/O on SGX.
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP), article 3, 9 pages.
ACM, June 2018.
doi:10.1145/3214292.3214295.
©Copyright ACM.
Abstract:
This paper presents work towards realizing architectural support for Bluetooth Trusted I/O on SGX-enabled platforms, with the goal of providing I/O data protection that does not rely on system software security. Indeed, we are primarily concerned with protecting I/O from all software adversaries, including privileged software. In this paper we describe the challenges in designing and implementing Trusted I/O at the architectural level for Bluetooth. We propose solutions to these challenges. In addition, we describe our proof-of-concept work that extends existing over-the-air Bluetooth security all the way to an SGX enclave by securing user data between the Bluetooth Controller and an SGX enclave.
Citable with [BibTeX]: \cite{peters:bastionsgx} Projects: [thaw] Keywords: [security] Available from the publisher: [DOI] Available from the author:
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