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These papers relate to the "Internet of Things" (IoT).Papers are listed in reverse-chronological order;
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In this paper we present MOAT, a system that leverages Wi-Fi sniffers to analyze the physical properties of a device's wireless transmissions to infer whether that device is located inside or outside of a home. MOAT can adaptively self-update to accommodate changes in the home indoor environment to ensure robust long-term performance. Notably, MOAT does not require prior knowledge of the home's layout or cooperation from target devices, and is easy to install and configure.
We evaluated MOAT in four different homes with 21 diverse commercial smart devices and achieved an overall balanced accuracy rate of up to 95.6%. Our novel periodic adaptation technique allowed our approach to maintain high accuracy even after rearranging furniture in the home. MOAT is a practical and efficient first step for monitoring and managing devices in a smart home.
Our workshop curriculum centers on the smart-home device lifecycle: obtaining, installing, using, and removing devices in a home. For each phase of the lifecycle, we present possible vulnerabilities along with preventative measures relevant to a general audience. We integrate a hands-on activity for participants to put best-practices into action throughout the presentation.
We ran our designed workshop at a science museum in June 2023, and used participant surveys to evaluate the effectiveness of our curriculum. Prior to the workshop, 38.8% of survey responses did not meet learning objectives, 22.4% partially met them, and 38.8% fully met them. After the workshop, only 9.2% of responses did not meet learning objectives, while 29.6% partially met them and 61.2% fully met them. Our experience shows that consumer-focused workshops can aid in bridging information gaps and are a promising form of outreach.
In this thesis, we present an end-to-end solution for providing information provenance for mHealth data, which begins by securing mHealth data at its source: the mHealth device. To this end, we devise a memory-isolation method that combines compiler-inserted code and Memory Protection Unit (MPU) hardware to protect application code and data on ultra-low-power micro-controllers. Then we address the security of mHealth data outside of the source (e.g., data that has been uploaded to smartphone or remote-server) with our health-data system, Amanuensis, which uses Blockchain and Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) technologies to provide confidential, yet verifiable, data storage and computation for mHealth data. Finally, we look at identity privacy and data freshness issues introduced by the use of blockchain and TEEs. Namely, we present a privacy-preserving solution for blockchain transactions, and a freshness solution for data access-control lists retrieved from the blockchain.
We envision a solution called the SPLICEcube whose goal is to detect smart devices, locate them in three dimensions within the home, securely monitor their network traffic, and keep an inventory of devices and important device information throughout the device’s lifecycle. The SPLICEcube system consists of the following components: 1) a main cube, which is a centralized hub that incorporates and expands on the functionality of the home router, 2) a database that holds network data, and 3) a set of support cubelets that can be used to extend the range of the network and assist in gathering network data.
To deliver this vision of identifying, securing, and managing smart devices, we introduce an architecture that facilitates intelligent research applications (such as network anomaly detection, intrusion detection, device localization, and device firmware updates) to be integrated into the SPLICEcube. In this thesis, we design a general-purpose Wi-Fi architecture that underpins the SPLICEcube. The architecture specifically showcases the functionality of the cubelets (Wi-Fi frame detection, Wi-Fi frame parsing, and transmission to cube), the functionality of the cube (routing, reception from cubelets, information storage, data disposal, and research application integration), and the functionality of the database (network data storage). We build and evaluate a prototype implementation to demonstrate our approach is scalable to accommodate new devices and extensible to support different applications. Specifically, we demonstrate a successful proof-of-concept use of the SPLICEcube architecture by integrating a security research application: an "Inside-Outside detection" system that classifies an observed Wi-Fi device as being inside or outside the home.
To address this problem, in this paper, we investigate the use of vibration, generated by a smartRing, as an out-of-band communication channel to unobtrusively share a secret with a smartThing. This exchanged secret can be used to bootstrap a secure wireless channel over which the smartphone (or another trusted device) and the smartThing can communicate. We present the design, implementation, and evaluation of this system, which we call VibeRing. We describe the hardware and software details of the smartThing and smartRing. Through a user study we demonstrate that it is possible to share a secret with various objects quickly, accurately and securely as compared to several existing techniques. Overall, we successfully exchange a secret between a smartRing and various smartThings, at least 85.9% of the time. We show that VibeRing can perform this exchange at 12.5 bits/second at a bit error rate of less than 2.5%. We also show that VibeRing is robust to the smartThing’s constituent material as well as the holding style. Finally, we demonstrate that a nearby adversary cannot decode or modify the message exchanged between the trusted devices.
In the Internet of Things (IoT), everyday objects are equipped with the ability to compute and communicate. These smart things have invaded the lives of everyday people, being constantly carried or worn on our bodies, and entering into our homes, our healthcare, and beyond. This has given rise to wireless networks of smart, connected, always-on, personal things that are constantly around us, and have unfettered access to our most personal data as well as all of the other devices that we own and encounter throughout our day. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that our personal devices and data are frequent targets of ever-present threats. Securing these devices and networks, however, is challenging. In this dissertation, we outline three critical problems in the context of Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) and present our solutions to these problems.
First, I present our Trusted I/O solution (BASTION-SGX) for protecting sensitive user data transferred between wirelessly connected (Bluetooth) devices. This work shows how in-transit data can be protected from privileged threats, such as a compromised OS, on commodity systems. I present insights into the Bluetooth architecture, Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX), and how a Trusted I/O solution can be engineered on commodity devices equipped with SGX.
Second, I present our work on AMULET and how we successfully built a wearable health hub that can run multiple health applications, provide strong security properties, and operate on a single charge for weeks or even months at a time. I present the design and evaluation of our highly efficient event-driven programming model, the design of our low-power operating system, and developer tools for profiling ultra-low-power applications at compile time.
Third, I present a new approach (VIA) that helps devices at the center of WPANs (e.g., smartphones) to verify the authenticity of interactions with other devices. This work builds on past work in anomaly detection techniques and shows how these techniques can be applied to Bluetooth network traffic. Specifically, we show how to create normality models based on fine- and course-grained insights from network traffic, which can be used to verify the authenticity of future interactions.
We present theoretical and practical evaluation of a method called SNAP -- SiNgle Antenna Proximity -- that allows a single-antenna Wi-Fi device to quickly determine proximity with another Wi-Fi device. Our proximity detection technique leverages the repeating nature Wi-Fi’s preamble and the behavior of a signal in a transmitting antenna’s near-field region to detect proximity with high probability; SNAP never falsely declares proximity at ranges longer than 14 cm.
Our system, CloseTalker, allows simple, secure, ad hoc communication between devices in close physical proximity, while jamming the signal so it is unintelligible to any receivers more than a few centimeters away. CloseTalker does not require any specialized hardware or sensors in the devices, does not require complex algorithms or cryptography libraries, occurs only when intended by the user, and can transmit a short burst of data or an address and key that can be used to establish long-term or long-range communications at full bandwidth.
In this paper we present a theoretical and practical evaluation of CloseTalker, which exploits Wi-Fi MIMO antennas and the fundamental physics of radio to establish secure communication between devices that have never previously met. We demonstrate that CloseTalker is able to facilitate secure in-band communication between devices in close physical proximity (about 5 cm), even though they have never met nor shared a key.
We present an authentication method for desktops called Seamless Authentication using Wristbands (SAW), which addresses the lack of intentionality limitation of proximity-based methods. SAW uses a low-effort user input step for explicitly conveying user intentionality, while keeping the overall usability of the method better than password-based methods. In SAW, a user wears a wristband that acts as the user’s identity token, and to authenticate to a desktop, the user provides a low-effort input by tapping a key on the keyboard multiple times or wiggling the mouse with the wristband hand. This input to the desktop conveys that someone wishes to log in to the desktop, and SAW verifies the user who wishes to log in by confirming the user’s proximity and correlating the received keyboard or mouse inputs with the user’s wrist movement, as measured by the wristband. In our feasibility user study (n=17), SAW proved quick to authenticate (within two seconds), with a low false-negative rate of 2.5% and worst-case false-positive rate of 1.8%. In our user perception study (n=16), a majority of the participants rated it as more usable than passwords.
We propose a new approach: using jamming to thwart adversaries located more than a few centimeters away, while still allowing devices in close physical proximity to securely share data. To accomplish this secure data transfer we exploit MIMO antennas and the Inverse-Square Law.
First, we present the findings of a user study we conducted to understand people’s authentication behavior: things they authenticate to, how and when they authenticate, authentication errors they encounter and why, and their opinions about authentication. In our study, participants performed about 39 authentications per day on average; the majority of these authentications were to personal computers (desktop, laptop, smartphone, tablet) and with passwords, but the number of authentications to other things (e.g., car, door) was not insignificant. We saw a high failure rate for desktop and laptop authentication among our participants, affirming the need for a more usable authentication method. Overall, we found that authentication was a noticeable part of all our participants’ lives and burdensome for many participants, but they accepted it as cost of security, devising their own ways to cope with it.
Second, we propose a new approach to authentication, called bilateral authentication, that leverages wrist-wearable technology to enable seamless authentication for things that people use with their hands, while wearing a smart wristband. In bilateral authentication two entities (e.g., user’s wristband and the user’s phone) share their knowledge (e.g., about user’s interaction with the phone) to verify the user’s identity. Using this approach, we developed a seamless authentication method for desktops and smartphones. Our authentication method offers quick and effortless authentication, continuous user verification while the desktop (or smartphone) is in use, and automatic deauthentication after use. We evaluated our authentication method through four in-lab user studies, evaluating the method’s usability and security from the system and the user’s perspective. Based on the evaluation, our authentication method shows promise for reducing users’ authentication burden for desktops and smartphones.
Our recognition method uses bioimpedance, a measurement of how tissue responds when exposed to an electrical current. By collecting bioimpedance samples using a small wearable device we designed, our system can determine that (a)the wearer is indeed the expected person and (b) the device is physically on the wearer’s body. Our recognition method works with 98% balanced-accuracy under a cross-validation of a day’s worth of bioimpedance samples from a cohort of 8 volunteer subjects. We also demonstrate that our system continues to recognize a subset of these subjects even several months later. Finally, we measure the energy requirements of our system as implemented on a Nexus S smart phone and custom-designed module for the Shimmer sensing platform.
To address this problem we propose ZEBRA. In ZEBRA, a user wears a bracelet (with a built-in accelerometer, gyroscope, and radio) on her dominant wrist. When the user interacts with a computer terminal, the bracelet records the wrist movement, processes it, and sends it to the terminal. The terminal compares the wrist movement with the inputs it receives from the user (via keyboard and mouse), and confirms the continued presence of the user only if they correlate. Because the bracelet is on the same hand that provides inputs to the terminal, the accelerometer and gyroscope data and input events received by the terminal should correlate because their source is the same -- the user’s hand movement. In our experiments ZEBRA performed continuous authentication with 85% accuracy in verifying the correct user and identified all adversaries within 11 s. For a different threshold that trades security for usability, ZEBRA correctly verified 90% of users and identified all adversaries within 50 s.
We present a wearable sensor to passively recognize people. Our sensor uses the unique electrical properties of a person’s body to recognize their identity. More specifically, the sensor uses bioimpedance -- a measure of how the body’s tissues oppose a tiny applied alternating current -- and learns how a person’s body uniquely responds to alternating current of different frequencies. In this paper we demonstrate the feasibility of our system by showing its effectiveness at accurately recognizing people in a household 90% of the time.
In order for such a vision to be successful, these devices will need to seamlessly interoperate with no interaction required of the user. As difficult as it is for users to manage their wireless area networks, it will be even more difficult for a user to manage their wireless body-area network in a truly pervasive world. As such, we believe these wearable devices should form a wireless body-area network that is passive in nature. This means that these pervasive wearable devices will require no configuration, yet they will be able form a wireless body-area network by (1) discovering their peers, (2) recognizing they are attached to the same body, (3) securing their communications, and (4) identifying to whom they are attached. While we are interested in all aspects of these passive wireless body-area networks, we focus on the last requirement: identifying who is wearing a device.
We conducted focus groups to understand the privacy concerns that patients have when they use mHealth devices. We conducted a user study to understand how willing patients are to share their personal health information that was collected using an mHealth device. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study that explores users’ privacy concerns by giving them the opportunity to actually share the information collected about them using mHealth devices. We found that patients tend to share more information with third parties than the public and prefer to keep certain information from their family and friends. Finally, based on these discoveries, we propose some guidelines to developing defaults for sharing settings in mHealth systems.
We provide a method to probabilistically detect this situation. Because accelerometers are relatively cheap and require little power, we imagine that the cellphone and each sensor will have a companion accelerometer embedded with the sensor itself. We extract standard features from these companion accelerometers, and use a pair-wise statistic -- coherence, a measurement of how well two signals are related in the frequency domain -- to determine how well features correlate for different locations on the body. We then use these feature coherences to train a classifier to recognize whether a pair of sensors -- or a sensor and a cellphone -- are on the same body. We evaluate our method over a dataset of several individuals walking around with sensors in various positions on their body and experimentally show that our method is capable of achieving an accuracies over 80%.